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RELIABILITY AVALIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY ANALYSIS 
IN NAVAL SHIPS   
SUMMARY 
Reliability Availability and Maintainability (RAM) analysis is performed to predict 
availability of a system in the future and to make amendments which will increase 
the performance of an equipment where necessary. Ram analysis has been used for 
many years by companies to decrease the number of failures of the equipments 
especially in warranty period. 
Naval ships have various missions to accomplish. In order to accomplish the mission, 
ship availability should be considered with utmost importance. To identify the 
availability and reliability of a ship, failure rates of ship’s components are used. Ram 
analysis computed by failure rates may be helpful for decision-makers in 
modernizing the ship equipments. Equipments which have lower reliability and 
availability, may be exchanged or may be modernized in order to increase the 
performance of the equipment and availability of the ship. 
In order to maintain the availability, i.e., ship may continue to accomplish the 
missions assigned, Naval Ships should go through reliability, availability and 
maintainability analysis during both building and life cycle.  Through Ram Analysis, 
components and systems, which reduce the availability of a ship, may be determined. 
Reliability and safety methods experienced a rapid development after the Second 
World War. These methods were mainly concerned with military use for electronics 
and rocketry studies. The first predictive reliability models appeared in Germany on 
the V1 missile project where a reliability level was successfully defined from 
reliability requirements and experimentally verified on components during their 
development stages. The first formal approach to shipboard reliability was the 
Buships specification, MIL-R-22732 of July 31, 1960, prepared by the United States 
of America’s Department of Defence and addressed ground and shipboard electronic 
equipment. After the success gained by  RAM Analysis in military area, RAM 
analysis has been used by commercial purposes. Producers needed to improve the 
reliability of their items in order to seize the confidence of customers. 
In this thesis, some of auxiliary class ships have been examined through the failures 
occurred between two overhauls. Reliability, availability and maintainability of the 
systems are calculated on component basis by the help of a commercial software 
named as Isograph Reliability Workbench. Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) has 
been prepared and analyzed.  
Components affecting the availability of the ship are reported. This information may 
be used to decide whether these systems or components should be replaced with 
better systems or components. In this thesis, also a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is 
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carried out manually in order to help ship crew in finding the reasons of common 
failures which may occur in ships.  
Results of RBD and FTA analysis are compared, and it is observed that they agree 
very well. The results include unavailability of system, failure frequency, 
unreliability, total down time of system and expected number of failures. While 
unreliability of system increases with working hours, unavailability of system does 
not change.  
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SAVAŞ GEMİLERİNDE RAM ANALİZİ 
ÖZET 
İngilizcede Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) analizi olarak 
kullanılan metod dilimizde  Güvenilirlik, Kullanılabilirlik ve  Sürdürülebilirlik 
Analizi olarak yer bulmaktadır. 
RAM analizinin yapılış amacı, bir sistemin gelecekte sahip olacağı kullanılabilirliği 
önceden tahmin ederek, eğer ihtiyaç varsa sistemde yapılmasının faydalı olacağı 
değerlendirilen değişiklikleri tespit edip, bu değişikliklerin uygulanıp 
uygulanmaması konusundaki  kararlara destek sağlamaktır. RAM analizi uzun 
yıllardır firmalarca kullanılmaktadır. Firmalar dizayn ve üretim süreçleri içerisinde 
RAM analizine yer vermektedirler. 
RAM analizi ile firmalar ürettikleri ürünlerin tüketicilere sunulduktan sonra, 
minimum sayıda veya hiç arıza yapmadan kullanım ömürlerini tamamlamalarını 
hedeflemektedirler. Bu maksatla ürünün çok fazla sayıda arıza yaptığı başlangıç 
periyodunu tüketiciye sunmadan önce fabrika ortamında tamamlamakta, arıza 
oranının neredeyse sabit hale geldiği kullanım ömrü periyodunda ürünü tüketiciye 
sunmaktadırlar. Bu şekilde firmaya ait ürün çok fazla sayıda meydana gelecek arıza 
nedeniyle piyasada kötü bir üne sahip olmamaktadır. Firma yaptığı RAM analizi 
sonucunda ürünün kullanım ömrünün başlangıcını tespit ederek tüketiciye sunulacağı 
zamanı kararlaştırmaktadır. Piyasada ise tüketiciler o firmaya ait ürünlerin az arıza 
yaptığı imajına sahip olacaklarından, firmaya ait ürünler daha fazla tercih edilir hale 
gelecektir. 
Güvenilirlik ve güvenlik konusundaki çalışmalar özellikle II.Dünya Savaşı’ndan 
sonra hız kazanmıştır. Bu çalışmalar genellikle elektronik cihazlar ve roket 
teknolojileri ile ilgili olarak yapılmaktaydı. Bu konuda güvenilirlik seviyesinin tam 
olarak tespit edildiği ve tespit edilen değerlerin deneylerle sistem bileşenlerinde ispat 
edildiği ilk çalışma olarak Almnya’da V1 füzelerinin üretiminde uygulamaya 
konulan RAM analizi sayılabilir. Ram analizi uygulamalarında ilk resmi uygulama 
ise, 1960 yılında Amerikan Savunma Bakanlığı tarafından elektronik cihazların 
güvenilirliği konusunda hazırlanan “Buships Spefications,  MIL-R- 22732”dir. ABD 
savunma bakanlığı ve NASA RAM analizi kullanımının yaygınlaşmasında bir tür 
öncü rolü üstlenmiştir. Füze ve uzay teknolojileri ile üretilen ürünler onarılabilirlik 
açısından zayıf olduklarından, üretim ve dizayn aşamasında yapılan RAM analizi ile 
ürün kullanıldıktan sonra ortaya çıkması muhtemel tüm arızaların önlenmesi 
amaçlanmıştır. Füze ateşlendikten sonra elektronik kartlardan birinde çıkacak bir 
arızanın onarımı mümkün olmadığından, füze ateşlenmeden önce muhtemel 
arızaların engellenmesi büyük önem taşımaktadır. 
NASA ve Amerikan Savunma Bakanlığı tarafından öncülüğü yapılan RAM analizi 
uygulamaları daha sonra sivil endüstriler tarafından da benimsenmiştir. Günümüzde 
beyaz eşya üreticilerine kadar bir çok sektörde dizayn ve üretim aşamalarında 
yapılan RAM analizi ile ürünler daha az arıza oranları ile tüketicilere sunulmaktadır. 
xxii 
 
Savaş gemilerine gerçekleştirmek üzere çok çeşitli görevler verilmektedir. Bu 
görevler verildiği anda geminin bu görevi gerçekleştirmeye hazır bulunması 
gereklidir. Savaş gemilerinin kullanılabilirliği bu aşamada önemlidir. 
Kullanılabilirliğin arttırılması için savaş gemilerini oluşturan bileşenlerin RAM 
analizine tabi tutulmaları gereklidir. RAM analizi yöntem olarak, dizayn ve test 
aşamalarında gerçekleştirilerek, üretime geçmeden önce ileride sistemlerin 
kullanılabilirliğini olumsuz etkileyecek parametrelerin tespit edilmesi ve 
iyileştirmelere gidilmesi şeklinde uygulanabileceği gibi, gemi yaşam periyodunda 
meydana gelen arızalar istatiksel olarak incelenerek RAM analizi yapılması ve 
gerekli iyileştirmelerin yapılması da mümkündür. Bu analizler sonrasında karar 
vericiler güvenilirliği ve kullanılabilirliği olumsuz etkileyen sistemlerin 
modernizasyonuna veya kullanımdan kaldırılmalarına karar verebilirler. 
Bu tezde Türk Deniz Kuvvetlerine ait yardımcı sınıf olarak görev yapan 5 eş gemi 
çalışma konusu yapılmıştır. Bu gemilerin iki overhol onarımı arasındaki arıza 
kayıtları incelenerek, gemi tipine ait genel bir güvenilirlik ve kullanılabilirlik 
değerlendirmesi yapılmıştır. 
Öncelikle bir yardımcı sınıf askeri geminin görev ihtiyaçlarını yerine getirebilmesi 
için gerekli olan minimum sistemler göz önüne alınarak bir gemi sistemi 
oluşturulmuştur. Bu geminin ana sistemleri olarak ana tahrik sistemi, elektrik üretim 
sistemi, dümen sistemi ve yara savunma sistemi ele alınmıştır. Bu dört sistemden 
birinin arızalanması durumunda geminin görev yapamayacağı değerlendirilmiştir. 
Beş geminin iki overhol arası arızaları incelenmiş, her bir cihazın en fazla sayıda 
arıza yapanı seçilmek suretiyle beş  gemi en çok arıza yapan cihazlardan oluşan sanal 
bir gemi olarak düşünülmüştür. Bu şekilde elde edilecek sonuçların en kötü 
senaryoyu ortaya koyacağı değerlendirilmiştir. 
Analizin yapılmasında Isograph firması tarafından verilen akademik lisans 
kullanılarak, Reliability Workbench 11.0 ticari programı kullanılmıştır. Programda 
öncelikle RBD modülünde gemi sistemi oluşturulmuştur. Daha sonra sistemin alt 
sistemleri ve alt sistemlerin kullanılabilirliğini etkileyen olaylar RBD modülüne 
eklenmiştir. Kullanılabilirliği etkileyen her bir olayın arıza modelleri, geçmişte 
meydana gelen arızalardan hesaplanan MTTF ve MTBF değerleri girilerek 
oluşturulmuştur. Isograph RWB tarafından, oluşturulan sistem ve arıza modelleri 
doğrultusunda analiz yapılarak, gerek alt sistemlerin, gerekse ana sistemlerin 
güvenilirlik, kullanılabilirlik değerleri hesaplanmış ve raporlanmıştır. Geminin görev 
yapmasını etkileyecek arızaların işlendiği bir hata ağacı FT modülünde hazırlanarak 
bu modülle de hesaplama yaptırılmış ve sonuçlar karşılaştırılmıştır. 
Elde edilen sonuçlar gemi tipinin kullanılabilirlik açısından tatmin edici  seviyede 
olduğunu göstermiştir. Güvenilirlik analizinde güvenilirliğin zamanla azaldığı tespit 
edilmiştir. Bu sorunun iki overhol arası süreyi azaltarak giderilebileceği 
vurgulanmakla birlikte, gemilerin kullanılabilirlik oranlarının yüksekliği nedeniyle 
sadece önemli cihazlarda yapılacak koruyucu ve ara bakımlarla yetinilebileceği 
değerlendirilmiştir. 
  
1 
 INTRODUCTION 1. 
Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) analysis is performed to predict 
availability of a system in the future and to make amendments which will increase 
the performance of the system. RAM analysis has been used for many years by 
companies to decrease the number of failures of the equipments especially in 
warranty period.  
Naval ships have various missions to accomplish. In order to accomplish the mission, 
ship availability should be considered with utmost importance. To determine 
availability and reliability of the ship, failure rates of ship’s components are used. 
Ram analysis computed by failure rates may be helpful for decision-makers in 
modernizing the ship equipments. Equipments which have lower reliability and 
availability, may be replaced or modernized in order to increase the performance of 
the equipment and availability of the ship.  
1.1 Purpose of Thesis 
In order to maintain the availability, i.e., ship may continue to accomplish the 
missions assigned, Naval Ships should go through reliability, availability and 
maintainability analysis during both building and life cycle.  Through Ram Analysis, 
components and systems, which reduce the availability of ship, can be determined.  
In this thesis, some of auxiliary class ships have been examined through the failures 
occurred between two overhaul. Reliability, availability and maintainability of the 
systems are calculated on component basis by the help of a commercial software. 
Components affecting the availability of the ship are reported. This information may 
be used to decide whether these systems or components should be replaced with 
better systems or components.  
In this thesis a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is carried out to help ship crew in finding 
the reasons of common failures which may occur in ships.  
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1.2 7 Literature Review 
Reliability and safety methods experienced a rapid development after the Second 
World War. These methods were mainly concerned with military use for electronics 
and rocketry studies. The first predictive reliability models appeared in Germany on 
the V1 missile project where a reliability level was successfully defined from 
reliability requirements and experimentally verified on components during their 
development stages (Bazovsky, 1961). 
The first formal approach to shipboard reliability was the “Buships Specification, 
MIL-R-22732” of July 31, 1960, prepared by the United States of America’s 
Department of Defence and addressed ground and shipboard electronic equipment. 
Subsequently in 1961 the Bureau of Weapons issued the MIL standards concerning 
reliability models for avionics equipment and procedures for the prediction and 
reporting of the reliability of weapon systems. This was due to the fact that the 
growing complexities of electronic systems were responsible for the failure rates 
leading to a significantly reduced availability on demand of the equipment (MIL 
1960). 
In February 1963 the first symposium on advanced marine engineering concepts for 
increased reliability was held at the office of Naval Research at the University of 
Michigan. In December 1963 a paper entitled “Reliability Engineering Applied to the 
Marine Industry” was presented at the Society of Naval Architects and Marine 
Engineers (SNAME) and the following year in June another paper, entitled 
“Reliability in Shipbuilding”, was presented. Following the presentation of these two 
papers, SNAME in 1965 established Panel M-22 to investigate the new discipline as 
applied to marine machinery and make it of use to the commercial marine industry. 
In the last three decades, stimulated by public reaction and health and safety 
legislation, the use of risk and reliability assessment methods has spread from the 
higher risk industries to an even wider range of applications. The Reactor Safety 
Study undertaken by the U.S.A. (U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1975) ) and 
the Canvey studies performed by the UK Health & Safety Executive resulted from a 
desire to demonstrate safety to a doubtful public. Both these studies made 
considerable use of quantitative methods, for assessing the likelihood of failures and 
for determining consequence models. 
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There is a long history in the United Kingdom (UK) on research, development and 
successful practical application of safety and reliability technology. There is a 
continuing programme of fundamental research in areas such as software reliability 
and human error in addition to further development of the general methodology. 
Much of the development work was carried out by the nuclear industry. Based on the 
considerable expertise gained in the assessment of nuclear plants, a National Centre 
for System Reliability (NCSR) was established by the UK Atomic Energy Authority 
(UKAEA) to promote the use of reliability technology. This organization plays a 
leading role in research, training, consultancy and data collection. The NCSR is part 
of the safety and reliability directorate of the UKAEA, which has played a major role 
in formulating legislation on major hazards, and has carried out major safety studies 
on industrial plants. It is noted that some of the major hazard studies commissioned 
at the national level in the UK have included the evaluation of the risks involved as a 
result of marine transportation of hazardous materials such as liquefied gases and 
radioactive substances. It is expected that the recent legislation in relation to the 
control of major hazards will result in a wider use of quantitative safety assessment 
methods and this will inevitably involve the marine industry. 
Most chemical and petrochemical companies in the UK have made use of safety and 
reliability assessment techniques for plant evaluation and planning. Similar methods  
are regularly employed in relation to offshore production and exploration 
installations. 
The Royal Navy has introduced reliability and maintainability engineering concepts 
in order to ensure that modern warships are capable of a high combat availability at 
optimum cost. The application of these methods has been progressively extended 
from consideration of the operational phase and maintenance planning to the design 
phase. To date, comparatively little use of safety and reliability assessment methods 
has been made in connection with merchant shipping. Lloyd’s Register of Shipping 
has for a long period, collected information relating to failures and has carried out 
development work to investigate the application of such methods to the classification 
of ships. Apart from this, some consultancy work has also been carried out on behalf 
of ship owners. One example is the P&O Grand Princess , for which a 
comprehensive safety and availability assurance study was carried out at the concept 
design stage of this cruise ship (Best and Davies, 1999). Established risk assessment 
4 
techniques were used including Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), 
flooding risk analysis and fire risk analysis. The resultant ship was believed to be 
better and safer than it would have been otherwise. P&O has now developed an in-
house safety management system which is designed to capture any operational 
feedback, so as to improve the safety and efficiency of its cruise fleet operation and 
to use it for better design in the future. The merchant ship-building yards in the UK, 
having seen the success of the warship yards in applying Availability, Reliability and 
Maintainability (ARM) studies at the design stage, are actively seeking benefits from 
adopting a similar approach. Some joint industry-university research projects are 
being undertaken to explore this area (Molland, 2008). 
1.3 Applications of RAM Analysis 
Reliability Availability and Maintainability (RAM) analysis is established at first by 
NASA and US Air Force, and later improved especially by household appliance 
producers in order to decrease the costs paid by themselves during the warranty 
period of the product.  
NASA has established this approach to reduce the chance of failure which may occur 
during the space program, since failures could not be repaired after launch of the 
space crafts. That’s why, to achieve minimum number of faults during space craft 
production has been very important for NASA. US Air Force followed NASA in 
RAM analysis applications. 
Especially in flight operations, some failures cause fatal consequences which makes 
the reliability highly important. As in space programs of NASA, US Air Force 
started to apply reliability programs particularly for electronic equipments. The aim 
was to decrease the failure rate of electronic devices. Reliability programs held by 
US air Force motivated US Department of Defence (DoD) to indicate some standards 
for reliability programs. MIL-STD-721C Definition of Terms for Reliability and 
Maintainability is one of the sources stating the definitions about RAM Analysis. 
Another source printed by DoD about RAM Analysis is MIL-STD-756B Reliability 
Modelling and Prediction including the information on modelling and predicting the 
reliability of a system. DoD has established lots of standards on reliability by 
publishing handbooks and directives. 
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After the success gained by  RAM Analysis in military area, RAM analysis was used 
by commercial purposes. Producers needed to improve the reliability of their items in 
order to seize the confidence of customers. Extended warranty periods are preferred 
by end user when two items to be bought were compared. Since extending the 
warranty period would increase the after-sales services costs, producers thought that 
it would be more economical to produce reliable items, instead of losing more money 
in repairs. Producers aimed to serve their products in their useful life in which less 
number of failures occur. Figure 1.1  shows bathtube curve including three phase of 
product life. First phase is initial period through which fabric tests are applied to 
products. In the initial period number of failures is high. Producers aim to deliver the 
products  to costumers after this period. Second phase is useful life of the product in 
which number of failures is less than initial period and wear-out period. During this 
period failure rate (λ) is  constant. 
 
Figure 1.1 : Bathtube curve. 
Currently most of the companies prepare reliability programmes to perform RAM 
Analysis in design phase. According to the results obtained from RAM Analysis, 
producers make necessary changes on project or product to increase the reliability. 
Making alterations in design phase decreases the expenditures of the company for the 
faults of the product which will be experienced after-sale phase. Repairs or 
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corrections after the product sold also cause bad reputation for the product and 
company.  
Because of the reasons explained above, RAM Analysis has gained well-deserved 
importance in almost every engineering area. Reliability prediction has been made 
for repairable and non-repairable items currently. For non-repairable and repairable 
items, reliability analysis has been made respectively on the basis of  Mean Time To 
Failure (MTTF) and Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF). For both types the aim 
targeted is to decrease the number of failures and increase MTTF or MTBF 
especially in warranty period of the product. Increasing the reliability of the products 
by programs hold has given producers an opportunity to extend the warranty periods. 
Thanks to the extended warranty periods, producer have got advantage in 
competition against the rivals. Products with extended warranty periods have been 
chosen by the customers, since these products made people think that they were more 
reliable than before. Producers also have got cuts in expenditures in warranty period 
which is determined according to the first phase of bath-tube curve for failures. RAM 
Analysis has shortened the first part of the curve through which more failures 
occurred compared with the latest life cycle of the product. Hence, producer still 
believe the benefits of RAM Analysis and commonly use reliability programmes in 
design periods. 
Since increasing concern and need for RAM Analysis in industrial area, reliability 
has found a place in engineering education as lectures on different engineering 
programmes. Some international meetings, conferences and trainings have been held 
about reliability and still continue. Some software have been prepared and provided 
commercially in order to make reliability  calculation of the complex systems.  
A marine application of RAM Analysis is “Study of Reliability, Maintainability and 
Availability: A Case Study of a Shuttle Tanker ropulsion System” by 
Balingwi.(1999). In this research, ship propulsion system is modelled in order 
topredict and optimize the effectiveness of the ship propulsion system. The 
objectives of this research were to review the process of evaluatinga shuttle tanker 
propulsion system’s reliability, maintainability and availability, and to investigate the 
computurised simulation statistical approach to help manage the information which 
is required in making intelligent maintenance and repair decisions.
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 DEFINITIONS 2. 
2.1 Reliability 
Reliability may be expressed as: “The probability that an item will perform  required 
function without failure under a stated condition for a stated period of time” 
(O’Connor, 1981). A customer, purchasing the product, accepts that it may fail at 
some future time. Coupling this acceptation with a warranty period relieves the 
customer about the failures of the item in future. But this relief does not last after 
warranty period. During the warranty period problems are solved by producer 
without any charge. It seems that failures occurred during warranty period are not 
problem for both side, customer and producer. In fact it is not so. Increase in number 
of failures causes warranty costs for the producer increase, as it is inconvenient for 
the customer also. Outside the warranty period, only customer suffers about the 
failures. In both cases, producer will probably incur a loss of reputation which may 
affect future business relations.  
Reliability may also be expressed in other ways. One of the definition states that 
“reliability for non-redundant items is the duration or probability of failure-free 
performance under stated conditions. For redundant items it may be expressed as the 
probability that an item can perform its intended function for a specified interval 
under stated conditions” (MIL-STD 721C). 
2.2 Maintainability 
Maintainability is an expression about repairable items. Non-repairable items are the 
ones used just for once and disposed i.e. fuel filters. Systems are repaired when they 
fail, and some labour force is spent for the system to work properly. These all efforts 
are fulfilled to maintain the system. How easy the system can be carried out by repair 
and other maintenance work shows the maintainability of the system. 
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Maintainability can be quantified as the mean time to repair (MTTR). The time 
needed for repair including several activities may be divided into three groups as 
below (O’Connor, 1981); 
1. Preparation time which consist of finding person for the job, travel,obtaining 
tools and test equipment, 
2. Active maintenance time at which job is actually done, 
3. Delay time caused by waiting for the spare parts etc after the job has already 
been started. 
Maintainability is expressed as “the measure of the ability of an item to be retained in 
or restored to specified condition when maintenance is performed by personnel 
having specified skill levels, using prescribed procedures and resources, at each 
prescribed level of maintenance and repair” (MIL-STD 721C). 
Maintained systems may be subject to corrective and preventive maintenance. 
Corrective maintenance includes all actions to return a system from a failed to an 
operating or available state. The amount of corrective maintenance is therefore 
determined by reliability. Corrective maintenance action cannot be planned. It may 
be needed even when it is not expected. The aim of preventive maintenance is to 
retain the system in an operational or available state. This aim may be achieved by 
preventing the failures before they happen. In a mechanical system it may be 
possible by the ways of lubrication, cleaning, inspection and calibration which are 
made in schedule. Preventive maintenance affects reliability of a system directly. 
2.3 Availability 
According to military standards of US Department of Defence, availability is 
described as; “a measure of the degree to which an item is an operable comitable 
state at the start of a mission when the mission is called at unknown (random) time 
(MIL-STD 721C). It is needed to explain the difference between availability and 
dependability. Availability concerns the time before the mission starts. If system is 
ready to perform the mission when it is ordered, then availability of the system is 
mentioned. But, if we talk about the system’s ability to continue its performance 
during the mission, then we emphasize dependability of the system. 
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The time taken to repair the failures and to carry out the preventive maintenance 
removes the system from the available state. There is thus a close relationship 
between reliability and maintainability , one affecting the other and both affecting 
availability and costs. Assuming that maintenance actions occur at a constant rate,  in 
a steady state after a transient behavior has settled down availability may be 
formulated as below (O’Connor, 1981); 
 
 
 
2.4  Redundancy 
The existence of more than one means to accomplishing a given mission is called as 
redundancy. In naval ships redundancy has high importance to increase the 
availability of a system without any interruption.  
2.5 Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) 
MTBF is described as the mean number of life units during which all parts of item 
perform in their specified limits, during a particular time interval under stated 
conditions. MTBF is a basic measure of reliability for repairable items. 
2.6 Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) 
MTTF is the mean number of life units of an item divided by the total number of 
failures within that population during a particular measurement interval in stated 
conditions. MTTF is a basic measure of reliability for non-repairable items. 
2.7 Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) 
The sum of corrective maintenance times at any maintenance level of repair divided 
by the total number of failures within an item repaired at that level during a particular 
interval in stated conditions. MTTR is a basic measure of maintainability.  
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 RELIABILITY 3. 
In the broadest sense, reliability is associated with dependability, with successful 
operation, and with the absence of breakdowns or failures. It is necessary for 
engineering analysis, however, it is about defining reliability quantitatively as a 
probability. Thus reliability is defined as the probability that a system will perform 
its intended function for a specified period of time under a given set of conditions.  
A product or system is said to fail when it ceases to perform its intended mission. 
This cessation may occur as entirely breakdown or as lower performance for the 
mission intended. A generator may not produce electricity because of the absence of 
exciting current. This type of failure may be referred as complete breakdown of the 
generator. But if it produces energy lower than it is intended, it has lower 
performance. This may  be caused by a failure on fuel supply system of the engine. 
In both case generator does not perform well. It is necessary to define failure 
quantitatively in order to take into account the more subtle forms of failure. Having 
knowledge of why the failure occurred in detail would help to calculate the reliability 
of the system more accurately. 
The expression of time in the definition of reliability may vary in some cases. When 
we consider a intermittently working device can we talk about calender time? If the 
operation is cyclic, such a on-off of a switch, time is likely to be cast in terms of 
number of the operations. If we consider a pump working intermittently, we should 
cast the time in terms of hours of operation. If we use calender time in calculations, 
then we must consider the frequency of starts and stops and the ratio of operating to 
total time. Instead of calender time, it seems better to use operating hours for the best 
practice. 
3.1 Reliability Mathematics 
Reliability concerns the probability of a device to have failure in a specific time 
period. Reliability can be specified as the mean number of failures in a given time 
which can be also described as failure rate or can be expressed as the mean time 
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between failures MTBF for repairable items, or as the mean time to failure MTTF for 
non-repairable items. Repairable items are repaired and returned to use again after 
repair. For repairable items, it is usually assumed that failures occur at constant rate, 
and it is expressed as (O’Connor, 1981); 
       
 
    
                       (3.1) 
3.2 Redundancy 
Redundancy has great importance in naval ships. All naval ship are designed in 
capability to serve continuously even when some devices have faults which prevent 
the device performing the mission properly. In order to provide uninterrupted 
mission accomplishment, main devices have standby systems which will work in 
case of failure of actual one. Thus, system performance is kept in any case of system 
failure. 
3.3 System Structures 
It is generally excepted that there are four generic types of relationships between a 
device and its components. These relationships may be expressed as series, parallel, 
k out of n and others. These relationships directly affect the redundancy of the 
system. 
3.3.1 Series systems 
The simplest and most commonly encountered configuration of components is the 
series system. “A series system is one in which all components must function 
properly in order for the system to function properly” (Nachlas, 2005). According to 
the definition, if one of the components fails, then system cannot perform the 
properly. Reliability block diagram for a series system may be shown as in Figure 
3.1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 : Series system. 
The function of system may be expressed as; 
1 2 3 
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 ( )  ∏   
 
                                                       (3.2) 
 
Only the functioning of all components yields system function. 
 
3.3.2 Parallel system 
The second type of components’ structure is the parallel structure. “A parallel system 
is one in which the proper function of any component implies system function” 
(Nachlas, 2005). One example of a parallel system is the set of two engines on a two 
engine electric supply system of a ship. As long as at least one of the engine function 
properly, supplement of electricity through the ship may be accomplished. The 
function for parallel system is; 
 ( )  ∐   
 
      ∏ (    
 
   )                          (3.3) 
The structure function for a parallel system may be expressed as Figure 3.2; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 : Parallel system. 
 
 
Conceptually a parallel system is failed when all system components are failed. 
Parallel arrangement of components is often referred to as redundancy. This is 
because the proper function of any of the parallel components implies proper 
function of the structure. Thus, the additional components are redundant until an 
actually performing component fails. Frequently, parallel structures are included in 
product designs specifically because of resulting redundancy. Often but not always, 
the parallel components are identical. At the same time, there are actually several 
ways in which the redundancy may be implemented. A distinction is made between 
1 
2 
3 
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redundancy obtained using a parallel structure in which all components function 
simultaneously and that obtained using parallel components of which one functions 
and the others wait as standby units until the failure of functioning unit. 
3.3.3 K-out-of-n systems 
“A k-out-of-n system is one in which the proper function of any k of the n 
components that comprise the system implies proper system function” (Nachlas, 
2005). In this type of structures, the number of components needed to imply the 
function properly is indicated by letter k, while system has more number of similar 
components which is indicated by letter n. 
Electric supply system of a large ship may be described by this type of structure. In 
large naval ships for example in frigates, there several number of generators to for 
electric supply. These generators placed in different parts of the ship may be 
designed to supply different networks or all may supply all the networks. In naval 
ships generators are designed to a power more than the ship needs. Even in a small 
naval boat such as coast guard boats, there are at least two generators for electric 
supply, even though one is enough. In large ships having 5 generators, 3 of them are 
on and it is enough to function the electric system. It has no importance which of the 
5 generators are on.  
The function for a k-out-of-n system; 
 ( )  {
                                     ∑   
 
       
 
                         (3.4) 
3.4 Failure rate 
The failure rate which is donated by λ, is expressed in terms of failures per unit time, 
such as failures per hour or failures per 100 hours or failures per 1000 hours. It is 
computed as a simple ratio of the number of failures, f, during a specified test 
interval T; 
  
 
 
            (3.5) 
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3.5 Mean time between failures (MTBF) 
During the operating period, when failure rate is fairly constant, MTBF is reciprocal 
of the constant failure rate to the number of failures (Govil, 1983) 
     
 
 
 
 
 
          (3.6) 
3.6 Mean time to failure (MTTF) 
For an information on n items with failures t1,t2,.....tn, MTTF is defined as; 
     
 
 
∑   
 
              (3.7) 
3.7 Mean time to repair (MTTR) 
For an information on n items with repair times t1,t2,.....tn, MTTR is defined as; 
     
 
 
∑   
 
              (3.8) 
3.8 Reliability 
The constant failure rate model for continously operating systems leads to an 
exponential distribution (Lewis, 1996). Probability density function for a constant 
failure rate (PDF); 
 ( )               (3.9) 
Similarly, cumulative distribution function (CDF) becomes 
 ( )                 (3.10) 
And reliability may be written as 
 ( )                    (3.11) 
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 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA) 4. 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a formal deductive procedure for determining 
combinations of component failures and human errors that could result in the 
occurrence of specified undesired events at the system level (Ang and Tang ,1984). 
It is a diagrammatic method used to evaluate the probability of an accident resulting 
from sequences and combinations of faults and failure events. This method can be 
used to analyse the vast majority of industrial system reliability problems. FTA is 
based on the idea that: 
1. A failure in a system can trigger other consequent failures. 
2. A problem might be traced backwards to its root causes. 
3. The identified failures can be arranged in a tree structure in such a 
way that their relationships can be characterised and evaluated 
(Andrews and Moss, 2002). 
4.1 Benefits To Be Gained From FTA 
There are several benefi ts of employing FTA for use as a safety assessment tool. 
These include: 
1. The Fault Tree (FT) construction focuses the attention of the analyst 
on one particular undesired system failure mode, which is usually 
identified as the most critical with respect to the desired function. 
2. The FT diagram can be used to help communicate the results of the 
analysis to peers, supervisors and subordinates. It is particularly useful 
in multi-disciplinary teams with the numerical performance measures. 
3. Qualitative analysis often reveals the most important system features. 
4. Using component failure data, the FT can be quantified. 
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5. The qualitative and quantitative results together provide the decision-
maker with an objective means of measuring the adequacy of the 
system design. 
An FT describes an accident model, which interprets the relation between 
malfunction of components and observed symptoms. Thus the FT is useful for 
understanding logically the mode of occurrence of an accident. Furthermore, given 
the failure probabilities of the corresponding components, the probability of a top 
event occurring can be calculated. A typical FTA consists of the following steps: 
1. System description. 
2. Fault tree construction. 
3. Qualitative analysis. 
4. Quantitative analysis. 
These steps are illustrated in Figure 4.1 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 : FTA Construction Steps. 
4.2 System Definition 
FTA begins with the statement of an undesired event, that is, failed state of a system. 
To perform a meaningful analysis, the following three basic types of system 
information are usually needed: 
1. Component operating characteristics and failure modes: A description 
of how the output states of each component are infl uenced by the 
input states and internal operational modes of the component. 
System description 
Fault tree construction 
Qualitative 
analysis 
Quantitative 
analysis 
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2. System chart: A description of how the components are 
interconnected. A functional layout diagram of the system must show 
all functional interconnections of the components. 
3. System boundary conditions: These define the situation for which the 
fault tree is to be drawn.  
4.3 Fault Tree Construction 
FT construction, which is the first step for a failure analysis of a technical system, is 
generally a complicated and time-consuming task. An FT is a logical diagram 
constructed by deductively developing a specific system failure, through branching 
intermediate fault events until a primary event is reached. Two categories of graphic 
symbols are used in an FT construction, logic symbols and event symbols. 
The logic symbols or logic gates are necessary to interconnect the events. The most 
frequently used logic gates in the fault tree are AND and OR gates. The AND gate 
produces an output if all input events occur simultaneously. The OR gate yields 
output events if one or more of the input events are present. The event symbols are 
rectangle, circle, diamond and triangle. The rectangle represents a fault output event, 
which results from combination of basic faults, and/or intermediate events acting 
through the logic gates. 
The circle is used to designate a primary or basic fault event. The diamond describes 
fault inputs that are not a basic event but considered as a basic fault input since the 
cause of the fault has not been further developed due to lack of information. The 
triangle is not strictly an event symbol but traditionally classified as such to indicate 
a transfer from one part of an FT to another. Figure 4.2 gives an example of a fault 
tree.  
To complete the construction of a fault tree for a complicated system, it is necessary 
first to understand how the system works. This can be achieved by studying the blue 
prints of the system (which will reflect the interconnections of components within 
the system). In practice, all basic events are taken to be statistically independent 
unless they are common cause failures. Construction of an FT is very susceptible to 
the subjectivity of the analyst. Some analysts may perceive the logical relationships 
between the top event and the basic events of a system differently. Therefore, once 
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the construction of the tree has been completed, it should be reviewed for accuracy, 
completeness and checked for omission and oversight. This validation process is 
essential to produce a more useful FT by which system weakness and strength can be 
identified. 
Figure 4.2 : FTA Example. 
4.4 Qualitative Fault Tree Evaluation 
Qualitative FTA consists of determining the minimal cut sets and common cause 
failures. The qualitative analysis reduces the FT to a logically equivalent form, by 
using the Boolean algebra, in terms of the specific combination of basic events 
sufficient for the desired top event to occur. In this case, each combination would be 
a critical set for the undesired event. The relevance of these sets must be carefully 
weighted and major emphasis placed on those of greatest significance. 
4.5 Quantitative Fault Tree Evaluation 
In an FT containing independent basic events, which appear only once in the tree 
structure, then the top event probability can be obtained by working the basic event 
probabilities up through the tree. 
In doing so, the intermediate gate event probabilities are calculated starting at the 
base of the tree and working upwards until the top event probability is obtained. 
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When trees with repeated events are to be analysed, this method is not appropriate 
since intermediate gate events will no longer occur independently. If this method is 
used, it is entirely dependent upon the tree structure whether an overestimate or an 
underestimate of the top event probability is obtained. Hence, it is better to use the 
minimal cut-set method. 
The occurrence probability of a top event can then be obtained from the associated 
minimum cut sets. The following two mini-trees are used to demonstrate how the 
occurrence probability of a top event can be obtained: 
 
 
Figure 4.3 : Minimum Cut Set 1. 
Obviously the minimum cut set for the mini-tree below is A · B . 
If one event is independent from the other, the occurrence probability of top event Z: 
 ( )   (   )   ( )  ( )     (4.1) 
where P(A) and P(B) are the occurrence probabilities of events A and B. 
 
Figure 4.4 : Minimum Cut Set 2 
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Obviously the minimum cut set for the mini-tree above is A + B. 
If one event is independent from the other, the occurrence probability of top event Z 
is 
 ( )   (   )   ( )   ( )   ( )  ( )        (4.2) 
where P(A) and P(B) are the occurrence probabilities of events A and B. 
FTA may be carried out in the hazard identification and risk estimation phases of the 
safety assessment of ships to identify the causes associated with serious system 
failure events and to assess the occurrence likelihood of them. It is worth noting that 
in situations where there is a lack of the data available, the conventional FTA method 
may not be well suited for such an application. 
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 SCOPE OF THE THESIS 5. 
Through this thesis, reliabilities of the main systems, which are crucial for the 
mission of the ship, have been analyzed. Firstly, the main systems required to 
accomplish the mission of the ship are determined. Systems are chosen so that even 
if one of the systems is failed, ship cannot perform the mission. Failure data are 
needed to compute reliability of the ship. They have been collected from 5 sister 
ships of Turkish Navy (TN). These ships are at service as auxiliary ships.  
Data have been collected from 5 ships for the period between two overhaul periods 
of the ships. Data from all ships are analyzed and the one which has highest number 
of failures is chosen for the project. Events are chosen from different ships and a 
virtual ship is determined with the events which are the highest among others. In this 
way the results compiled by the project will be the worst case for the ship class. 
The systems chosen for an auxiliary ship are propulsion system, steering gear 
system, damage control system and electric supply system, shown in Figure 5.1. 
These systems have been branched to subsystems and components. Each 
component’s number of failures’ data has been used to compute failure rate of the 
components. Failure rates, MTTF, MTTR and MTBF have been computed on a MS 
Excel sheet. It is assumed that components have constant failure rates and reliability 
values are computed according to exponential distribution as shown Equation 3.11. 
 
Figure 5.1 : Ship SystemRBD. 
Failure rate and MTBF data have been imported to Isograph Reliability Workbench 
11.0. By using the software RBDs  for each system including all components, have 
been prepared. MTTF and MTTR values of the components have been imported to 
the software and unavailability and unreliability values of the system have been 
computed.  
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After preparing RBDs for the ship’s systems, fault tree (FT) construction has been 
produced by the software. Since FT  produced by software is complicated and hard to 
follow, simplified FT of the systems are prepared manually. 
5.1 Assumptions 
Through the thesis, five of an auxiliary class of Turkish Navy Ships have been 
examined. Failure reports of five ships have been collected. The mostly experienced 
failures in all ships have been examined and the one which has highest failure rate 
among identical components has been chosen for analysis. For all the systems 
working hour has been identified as the time between two overhaul period, which is 
being executed as 6 years for the class of ships in Turkish Navy.  
For the systems and components serving as auxiliary apparatus e.g. fuel transfer 
pump, fire-figthing pump, hatches, portholes etc., six years of maintenance period, 
which is equal to 52560 hours has been identified as working hours. 
For propulsion units, number of failures have been collected in all ships and it 
assumed that five ships’ propulsion systems are identical. The number of working 
hours of chosen component has been taken into account. The working hour is 
recalculated directly proportional to ship’s overhaul period 6 years, 52560 hours in 
order to use the same project time for all the ship systems. 
For electric production generators No:1 and No:2 of all ships have been examined 
and in order to represent the worst case, highest number of failures of the 
componenets have been chosen as in propulsion system. 
For Steering Gear System working hours of the components have been taken 
according to the number of working hours of the propulsion components, since 
Steering Gear would have the same working hours with propulsion system. 
5.2 Utilization of Isograph Reliability Workbench 11.0. 
Isograph Reliability Workbench is a windows based commercial software capable of 
reliability production. First step in software is preparing reliability block diagram. 
Blocks for each component must be prepared and linked according to the system 
construction. For this thesis, values which should be filled in are MTTF and MTTR 
for each event. After linking the components and filling the MTTF and MTTR 
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values, software computes the unavailability of the components and systems to 
compute total unavailability of the project (Isograph, 2011). 
The Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) module allows the user to build an RBD to 
represent the system to be modelled. The blocks in the diagram represent sub 
systems, components and events that can occur in the system. The logic of the 
system is dictated by the way in which the blocks are connected together. 
Once the RBD is constructed, the diagram may be populated with failure and repair 
information. Analysis of the system returns estimates of system parameters, minimal 
cut set data and importance information for highlighting critical areas of the system. 
Before building an RBD it is first necessary to create a System. A System represents 
the highest level of the system to be modelled. Once created, the new System will 
appear in the Tree Control under the RBD Pages node. The user may then select the 
System in the Tree Control and add RBD structure in the diagram area. 
In the RBD, blocks represent sub systems, components and events. Each block can 
have failure and repair data associated with it. The arrangements in which the blocks 
are connected determine the logic of the system and thus affect the minimal cut sets 
and system parameters. An example of RBD shown in Figure 5.2. 
Nodes may be used to commence and terminate parallel RBD arrangements, and to 
manipulate the behaviour of those arrangements. For example, in a voted 
arrangement the vote number is applied at the output node. Nodes may also be used 
to alter the shape of connections on screen. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 : RBD construction example. 
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A large RBD can become difficult to view and to navigate. Hence, as an RBD gets 
larger it may become necessary to break it down into more manageable pieces. 
Furthermore, the user may wish to view results for different sub systems, as well as 
for the system as a whole. Both of these goals can be achieved using the sub system 
facility of the RBD module. 
In order to determine system parameters such as unavailability and failure frequency 
the user must allocate failure and repair data to the component blocks in the RBD. 
This is done via the Generic Failure Models. A Generic Failure Model may be 
created containing failure and repair information. Screenshot of Generic Failure 
Model input box is shown in Figure 5.3. It may then be allocated to one or more 
blocks in the RBD. Blocks which use the same Generic Model will share the same 
failure data but will remain independent of one another. List of the generic failure 
models generated for this project is illustrated in Appendix A. 
 
Figure 5.3 : Failure model window. 
Before analyzing the project, the user must first make sure that the system lifetime is 
set correctly. For this thesis, life-time is assigned as 6 years meaning 52560 hours 
and actual working hours of main engines 2500/2550 hours and of generators 
3260/3270 hours are projected to 6 years life-time. 
The Fault Tree module allows the user to build a fault tree to represent the system to 
be modelled. An example of FT is shown in Figure 5.4. A fault tree consists of logic 
27 
gates representing systems and sub systems, and basic events at the roots of the tree 
representing component failures and events. The type of logic gates selected dictate 
the way in which the failures interact. 
 
Figure 5.4 : Faul tree example. 
Failure mode, unavaliability values may be shown under blocks after completing the 
analysis. Results may be exported by various reports. Some reports generated by 
Isograph Reliability Workbench 11.0.are shown in Appendices A-I. 
5.3 Isograph Reliability Workbench 11.0. Calculations 
5.3.1 Unavailability of a component (Q) and component failure frequency (ω) 
To calculate the unavailability of a component, software needs inputs of failure rate 
(λ), MTTF and MTTR values, which are both calculated on a MS Excel sheet. 
Failure rate (λ) is defined as; 
  
 
    
      (5.1) 
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The unavailability of a component (Q) is calculated by the software as; 
 ( )  
     
       
          (5.2) 
Failure frequency of the component is; 
 ( )   (   ( ))           (5.3) 
5.3.2 Unavailability of a sub-system and system (Qsys) 
The structure of a reliability block diagram (RBD) defines the logical interaction of 
failures within a system. Individual blocks may represent single component failures, 
sub-system failures and other events that may contribute towards system failures. 
The reliability behavior of an individual sub-system block may be represented by a 
RBD at a lower hierarchical level.  
For the system to be successful in its operation, at least one path must be maintained 
between the system input and output nodes. A simple series arrangement of 3 blocks 
A, B and C would only require one of the blocks to fail to eliminate the single 
success path from input to output node. Simple series arrangement of a system is 
shown on Figure 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.5 : Simple series arrangement. 
System unavailability of a serially connected components is calculated as, 
     ∑   
 
            (5.4) 
For the example series arrangement above, System unavailability is, 
                        (5.5) 
A simple parallel arrangement of 3 blocks A, B and C would require all 3 blocks to 
fail to eliminate the 3 success paths from input to output node.  
29 
 
Figure 5.6 : Simple parallel arrangement. 
Figure 5.6 shows a simple parallel arrangement of components. System 
unavailability of a parallel connected components is calculated by; 
     ∏   
 
           (5.6) 
For the sysytem shown on Figure 5.5, system unavailability; 
                      (5.7) 
Since only one path is enough for the success of the system, if one of the 
componenets’ unavailability equals to zero, then system unavailability becomes zero. 
Total ship unavailabilty is calculated by Equations (5.5) and (5.7) according to the 
systems’ types of arrangement. 
5.3.3 Cut sets occurance probability (Qcut) 
The RBD Module uses efficient minimal cut sets generation algorithms to analyze 
large and complex RBDs. Cut sets represent a minimal combination of failures which 
will cause the system to fail. Table of the cut sets generated by software, which are 
affecting system unavailability, is illustrated on Appendix B.  
Cut set occurance probability may be expressed as, 
     ∏   
 
        (5.8) 
where Qi is the unavailability of the ith event in the cut set. 
Failure frequency of the cut set may be expressed as, 
     ∑   
 
   ∏   
 
   
   
        (5.9) 
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 TOTAL SHIP RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 6. 
RWB software analyzes the system and, unavailability and unreliability results of the 
components and systems are computed by RWB. A block in RBD represents an 
event of a component or a system which has more than one component’s events.  
Serial or parallel arrangement of components determines how the calculations are 
carried out. Sub-system results are computed through components contributing 
system unavailability. At the end, for this project, a total ship unavailability result is 
calculated by the software.  The list of the events contributing to ship unavailability 
and prepared as blocks in RBD are listed with generic failure types in Appendix C. 
Those blocks which have no generic failure data represent a sub-system or system in 
RBD and they do not need generic failure data input, since components’ generic 
failure data are used in calculation. 
6.1 MTTF-MTTR Calculations 
According to the model type chosen for the project, RWB needs some inputs for the 
calculation. For this project, MTTF model type has been chosen and necessary inputs 
are MTTF and MTTR values. The MTTF and MTTR values have been calculated on 
MS Excel Worksheet and shown in Appendix D. These values have been imported to 
RWB via Generic Failure Models. 
Data used to calculate MTTF and MTTR are listed on event basis in Appendix E and 
Appendix F respectively. 
In order to calculate MTTF and MTTR values, data from ships’ log books have been 
used. MTTF and MTTR have been calculated by the Equations (3.7) and (3.8) 
respectively on a MS Excel worksheet. 
6.2 Unavailability Calculations 
RWB makes unavailability calculations for the system, sub-systems and components 
acccording to the values inserted into events’ generic failure models. Before starting 
the analysis, RBD should be prepared. 
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RBD has been constructed according to the effects of the events about the 
accomplishment of the ship’s mission. After constructing the RBD, generic failure 
models were prepared and attached to the relevant events. Software analayzed the 
system and unavailabilities have been computed. RBDs with unavailability results 
for the system, sub-systems and events are shown in Appendix G. 
RWB has calculated unavailabilities of the events according to the Eqs. (5.1) and 
(5.2). Unavailabilities of the sub-systems and system have been calculated by RWB 
according to the Eqs. (5.4) and (5.6). 
In order to find unavailability of a serially arranged system or sub-system, 
unavailabilities of the events or sub-systems composing the relevant sub-system or 
system are summed. To find unavailability of a sub-system or system constructed in 
parallel, unavailabilities of the events or sub-systems are multiplied. Hence, in a 
parallel arrangement, if one of the events has unavailability value as zero, then 
mission can be accomplished and unavailability of the sub-system or system equals 
to zero. 
6.3 Results and Discussion 
RWB calculates system unavailability and this result may show how reliable the 
system is. RWB reports unavailability, failure frequency and unreliability of each 
RBD blocks. This report is shown in Appendix H. 
Unavailability of the sub-system is a function of MTBF, MTTR and preventive 
maintenance. In this project, preventive maintenance time is neglected. 
Unavailability and failure frequency of a sub-system are constant. Since reliability of 
the system is the function of failure rate (λ) and time as indicated at Equation (3.11), 
RWB calculates system and sub-systems’ unreliabilities in 20 working hour steps. As 
shown in Appendix H, unreliability value of the sub-systems are increasing 
proportionally with working hours. Unreliability of the system (Fsys) is calculated by 
the software as; 
        
 ∫     ( )  
 
       (6.1) 
Where λsys is system failure rate and calculated as; 
     
    
      
            (6.2) 
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Where ωsys is system failure frequency and calculated as; 
     ∑      
 
              (6.3) 
 Reliability values may be calculated by Eq. (6.4); 
                                                    (6.4) 
RWB also calculates total down time (TDTsys) and number of expected failures 
(Wsys) by the Eqs. (6.5) and (6.6) respectively. 
       ∫     
 
 
( )        (6.5) 
     ∫     ( )   
 
 
     (6.6) 
6.3.1 Unavailability of main sub-systems 
Four main sub-system have been constructed for the ship type examined. These sub-
systems are serially arranged and directly affect the availability of the ship. 
Unavailability diagram of main sub-systems is shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1 : Unavailability of main sub-systems. 
Since unavailability is a function of failure rate (λ) and MTTR, it does not change 
with working hour. System unavailability is computed through the unavailabilities of 
the cut sets by cross-product method in RWB as; 
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 (6.5) 
Ship total unavailability may be calculated also by summation of main sub-systems’ 
unavailabilities. Sub-system Damage Control contribution is higher than other 
systems, since the unavailability of portholes increases the unavailability of water-
tight compartments. Total ship system’s unavailability was calculated by RWB as 
Q=0,0003726. The availability of the system and sub-systems may be calculated by; 
                       (6.6) 
The availability of total ship system then becomes 0,996274. This availability value 
is very high and shows that, during the project time, the ship is highly capable of 
accomplishing the mission. 
6.3.2 Number of expected failures of main sub-systems 
Number of expected failures of the sub-systems are calculated by RWB and shown in 
Figure 6.2. Damage Control system has highest number of expected number of 
failures. 
 
Figure 6.2 : Number of expected failures of main sub-systems. 
6.3.3 Unreliability of main sub-systems 
Unreliabilities of system and sub-systems are calculated and plots are prepared by 
RWB, as shown in Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 respectively. It is observed from these 
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figures that, unreliabilities of the system and sub-systems are increasing with 
working hour, since reliability is an exponential function of failure rate (λ) and time. 
Since failure rate (λ) is constant for the project time, 52560 hours, working hour of 
the system increases the unreliability of the system. Reliability of a component can 
be calculated by Eq. (3.11) and by the unreliability results of RWB.  
It is usual that reliability of the system decreases towards the end of the project time. 
When Figure 6.4 examined, it is obvious that, Damage Control main sub-system has 
the most contribution to low reliability value of the system. Contributions of the 
main sub-systems via their sub-systems are examined below in detail. 
 
Figure 6.3 : Unreliability of system.  
6.3.3.1 Contribution of propulsion sub-system 
Propulsion system is composed of two main diesel engines including events and sub-
systems. RWB result summary of propulsion system is shown on Table 6.1. As 
shown on Table 6.1, Total Down Time (TDT) of propulsion system, which is 
consisted of Main Engine No:1 and Main Engine No:2, is 0,202 hours through 
project time 52560 hours. This low value is due to the parallel arrangement of main 
engines in propulsion system RBD. Only one of the engines is accepted as sufficient 
in order to accomplish the mission of the ship.  
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Figure 6.4 : Unreliabilities of main sub-systems. 
When Table 6.1 is examined, it is seen that, unreliabilities of each engine are 
calculated as 1. But RWB calculated propulsion system’s unreliability as 0,1305, 
since RWB uses cut sets’ unreliabilities and unavailabilities to calculate system’s 
unreliability and unavailability. Cut sets used in calculation are illustrated in 
Appendix B. These cut sets are generated by software according to their effects on 
sub-system’s success. 
Table 6.1 : Propulsion system result summary. 
 Unavailability Unreliability 
No.of 
Expected 
Failures 
TDT MTTF MTTR 
Propulsion 
System 
3,87E-06 0,1305 0,1398 0,202 3,74E+05 1,448 
Main Eng. 
No:1 
0,002248 1 31.93 117,6 1641 3,701 
Main Eng. 
No:2 
0,00172 1 37,93 89,94 1383 2,383 
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Figure 6.5 : Main Engine No:1 unavailability diagram. 
Contributions of sub-systems to Main Engines’ unavailabilities are shown in Figures 
6.5 and 6.6 Unavailabilities of the sub-systems are constant since failure rate does 
not change with time. 
 
Figure 6.6 : Main Engine No:2 unavailability diagram. 
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Figure 6.7 : Main Engine No:1 unreliability-time diagram. 
 
Figure 6.8 : Main Engine No:2 unreliability-time diagram. 
Sub-systems’ contribution to unreliabilities of Main Engines are shown on Figures 
6.7 and 6.8 As shown on diagram, unreliabilities of the sub-systems increase with 
working hours. 
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6.3.3.2 Contribution of steering gear sub-system 
Result summary of steering gear sub-system is shown on Table 6.2. As seen on Table 
6.2, almost all sub-systems of steering gear have unavailability values of zero. 
System unavailability and unreliability are affected by failures of S/G electric supply 
section board. 
Table 6.2 : Steering Gear System Result Summary 
 Unavailability Unreliability 
No.of 
Expected 
Failures 
TDT MTTF MTTR 
Steering 
Gear 
System 
3,425E-05 0,9502 3 1,791 1,751E+04 0,6 
S/G Pumps 0 0,003622 0,003628 0 1,441E+07 - 
S/G 
Hyd.Sys 
0 0,000454 0,0004541 0 1,151E+08 - 
S/G Room 
Components 
0 0,0001325 0,0001325 0 3,945E+08 - 
The availability value for steering gear sub-system is calculated as 0,99966. 
Unreliability of steering gear sub-system versus working hour is shown on Figure 
6.9. As expected, because of constant failure rate, reliability of the system decreases 
with time. 
 
Figure 6.9 : Unreliability of steering gear sub-system. 
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6.3.3.3 Contribution of electric power sub-system 
Result summary of RWB for electric power sub-system is shown on Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 : Electric power sub-system’s result summary. 
 Unavailability Unreliability 
No.of 
Expected 
Failures 
TDT MTTF MTTR 
Electric 
Power 
System 
9,845E-05 0,9998 8,317 5,149 6316 0,622 
GENSET 
No:1 
0,0003842 1 34,98 20,09 1501 0,5773 
GENSET 
No:2 
0,008614 1 41,64 450,5 1251 10,87 
Main 
Switchboard 
3,805E-05 0,9933 5 1,99 1,051E+04 0,4 
Section 
Boards 
0,0001332 0,9997 7,999 6,964 6565 0,875 
Emergency 
Power 
Supply 
5,707E-05 0,9975 6 2,985 8754 
0,5 
 
Unavailabilities of electric power sub-systems are shown on Figure 6.11. Although 
unavailability of Genset No:2 is higher than other sub-systems, total unvailability is 
low, since Genset No:2 is connected to Genset No:1 in parallel.  
 
Figure 6.10 : Unavailabilities of electric power sub-systems. 
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Unreliabilities of electric power sub-systems are shown on Figure 6.12. Since 
Gensets have generators and diesel engines total reliabilities get higher with time and 
cut sets unreliabilities cause system unreliability to become high at the end of project 
time. 
Unavailabilities and unreliabilities of Genset No:1 and No:2 are shown in Figures 
6.13, 6.14, 6.15 and 6.16 respectively. Although unavailability of Gensets are low, 
unreliability values get higher with working hour. As indicated in description of 
reliability, reliability values represent the probability of failure occurance in system. 
Since availabilities are high, we may conclude that gensets are properly working in 
ship system. Because with a constant failure rate, it is normal to have lower 
reliabilities at the end of the project time. 
 
 
Figure 6.11 : Unreliabilities of electric power sub-systems. 
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Figure 6.12 : GENSET No:1 unavailability. 
 
Figure 6.13 : GENSET No:1 unreliability. 
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Figure 6.14 : GENSET No:2 unavailability. 
 
 
Figure 6.15 : GENSET No:2 unreliability. 
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6.3.3.4 Contribution of damage control sub-system 
Damage control sub-system consist of components related with especially ship’s 
floatability and preventive considerations against fire-fighting and water disharge 
systems. Other system is fuel transfer system which is necessary for ship’s 
propulsion and electric power systems. RWB analze result summary is illustrated on 
Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4 : Damage control sub-system result summary. 
 Unavailability Unreliability 
No.of 
Expected 
Failures 
TDT MTTF MTTR 
Damage 
Control 
System 
0,000236 1 16,03 12,34 3275 0,7739 
Fire 
Fighting & 
Water 
Discharge 
System 
4,858E-05 0,9822 4,028 2,54 1,304E+04 0,6338 
Watertight 
Departments 
7,229E-05 0,9999 8,999 3,781 5838 0,4222 
 
Unavailabilities and unreliabilities of Damage Control Sub-systems are shown 
respectively on Figures 6.17 and 6.18. 
 
Figure 6.16 : Damage control unavailability. 
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Figure 6.17 : Damage control unreliability. 
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 FAULT TREE CONSTRUCTION 7. 
RWB Fault Tree analysis calculates unavailability, failure frequency and 
unreliability of project. RWB has facility to convert RBD to FT diagram. Since FT 
generated by RBD is difficult to follow in determining the reason of the failure in 
ship’s main sub-systems, a simplified FT for the project has been prepared in RWB. 
The simplified FT diagrams are shown in Appendix I. In construction process, logic 
of RBD has been used. Serially arranged events and systems are represented by OR 
gates and parallel arranged events and sub-systems are represented by AND gates. 
Top gate represents “ship cannot accomplish the mission” event. When ship cannot 
accomplish the mission, at least one of four sub-system may have failure. If FT is 
followed from top to bottom, failure causing the mission interrupt or making system 
unavailable may be determined. 
An analysis has been carried out for the simplified FT and the results generated have 
been checked against the results of RBD as shown in Table 7.1. It is approved that 
the simplification of original FT converted from RBD is satisfactory.. 
Table 7.1 : RBD and FT analaysis results. 
System Unavailability Unreliability 
No.of 
Expected Failures 
RBD/ FT RBD FT RBD FT RBD FT 
Total Ship 0,0003726 0,0003726 1 1 27,48 27,48 
Propulsion 
System 
3,87E-06 3,867E-06 0,1305 0,1302 0,1398 0,139 
Steering 
Gear 
3,425E-05 3,425E-05 0,9502 0,9502 3 3 
Electric 
Power 
System 
9,845E-05 9,844E-05 0,9998 0,9998 8,317 8,316 
Damage 
Control 
0,000236 0,000236 1 1 16,03 16,03 
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 CONCLUSIONS 8. 
8.1 Unavailability Results 
According to the analysis of the sample ship type chosen for the project, Ship has 
low unavailability value and number of expected failures calculated by RWB for 
total ship system is not high for the selected project time of six years. Low 
unavailability values may be interpreted that ship will be ready to accomplish the 
mission for most of the time through the period considered. 
When the unavailabilities of the main systems are examined, it is obvious that 
damage control sub-system is most contributing one in increasing the unavailability 
of ship system. The reason of this contribution may be explained by checking the 
unavailabilities of damage control sub-systems. Water-tight compartments including 
hatchways and portholes have high number of failures. Even though these systems do 
not cause the mission interrupt directly, according to the regulations of naval ships, 
water-tigthness between compartments is necessary for a naval ship to be missioned. 
These kinds of failures are very important for the ship to go underway. Since in case 
of fire or water flooding, these failures may cause huge damages, ship with these 
kinds of failures is accepted as unavailable for the mission. 
Ship propulsion system and steering gear system have 2500 working hours which are 
projected to 52560 hours. These systems have also low unavailability values for the 
selected project time. The reason for the low unavailability may be explained by the 
age of the ships. Project time, which has been selected, is the period after first 
overhaul of the ships.Systems are just at the beginning of the useful life described on 
Figure 1.1 Bathtube curve. Probably low number of failures is due to the age of the 
systems. Number of failures and unavailability may increase proportionally as the 
system components age in future. 
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8.2 Unreliability Results 
Unreliability values calculated by RWB show that unreliabilities of the sub-systems 
are increasing with time as expected. It is usual that unreliability of a system with 
contant failure rate, increases with working hours because of the definition of 
unreliability, Equation 6.1. Unreliability of propulsion system is so high, since one 
propulsion unit is accepted enough for accomplishing the mission. In case two 
propulsion unit was mandatory for the mission, the propulsion system should be 
constructed in a serial arrangement, and then unreliability of propulsion system 
would be higher. 
8.3 Suggestions 
In order to decrease unavailability of the ship, standby components can be designed 
for the components which decrease the availability of the sub-systems. As an 
example, additional submersible pump for water discharge system would increase the 
availability of damage control sub-system. 
Another solution to increase availabilities of the sub-systems is to make additional 
preventive maintenance for the components which cause system failure. For instance, 
according to the results compiled by RWB, especially leakage problems cause 
unavailability increase. Preventive maintenance would decrease the number of 
failures occured in piping systems, so availability of the system increases. 
Unreliability indicates a probability of failure for the systems. Since all the system 
components are repairable or replacable, maintainability of the system can be 
assured. Although reliability of the system decreases with time, availability is 
constant, because of constant failure rates. In order to increase reliability, the period 
between two overhaul can be decreased or maintenance procedures can be put into 
effect for the key components like engines, generators and steering gear components. 
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APPENDIX G 
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Page 3 of 49 
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S/G PUMPS
S/G Pump Failure
Page 15
Q=0
S/G HYD SYS
Hydraulic System
Failure
Page 16
Q=0
MANUAL S/G
Manual System
Failure
MANUAL S/G
MTTF=52560
Q=0
S/G PIPING
Leakage on S/G
Hydraulic Piping
S/G PIPING
MTTF=17520
Q=3,425E-05
S/G ROOM COMPONENTS
S/G Room Hydraulic
Components Failure
Page 17
Q=0
STEERING GEAR SECTION BOARD
Electric Supply
Problem on S/G
Section Board
STEERING GEAR 
SECTION BOARD
MTTF=26280
Q=1,903E-05
Sub-system STEERING GEAR See page 2
Page 4 of 49 
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GENSET1
No Electric
Production
Page 8
Q=0,0003842
MAIN SWITCH BOARD
Main Switch Board
Failure
Page 9
Q=3,805E-05
ELEC WIRING NETWORK
Electrical Wiring
Failure
ELEC WIRING 
NETWORK
MTTF=17520
Q=5,707E-05
SECTION BOARDS
Priorr Section Boards
Failure
Page 10
Q=0,0001332
EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY
Emergency Power Supply
Failure
Page 11
Q=5,707E-05
GENSET2
No Electric
Production
Page 41
Q=0,008614
Sub-system ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM See page 2
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FI RE FI GHTI NG &  WATER DI SCHARGE SYSTEM
Fire Fighting &
Water Discharge
System Failure
Page 12
Q=4,858E-05
DO TRA SYS
DIESEL OIL
TRANSFER
SYSTEM
Page 13
Q=0,0001152
W/T DEPTS
WATER-TIGHT
DEPARTMENTS
Page 14
Q=7,229E-05
Sub-system DAMAGE CONTROL SYSTEM See page 2
Page 6 of 49 
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MAIN ENG FUEL SYSTEM1
No Fuel Supply
Page 18
Q=0,0003234
MAIN ENG LUBOIL SYS1
Lub.Oil Pressure
Low
Page 19
Q=0
M A I N  E N G  C O O L I NG  WATER1
Fresh Water Temp
High
Page 20
Q=0
MAIN ENG LUB OIL TEMP1
Lub Oil Temp High
Page 21
Q=0
MAI N ENG CHARGE AI R SYSTEM1
Air Supply Failure
Page 22
Q=0,001823
MAIN ENG START SYS1
Starter Failure
Page 23
Q=7,61E-06
MAIN ENG ALARM SYS1
Alarm Syatem
Failure
MAIN ENG  
ALARM SYS1
MTTF=17520
Q=3,805E-05
MAI N ENG LUB OI L MI XED WATER 1
Water Mixed into
Lub Oil
MAIN ENG LUB  
OIL MIXED  
WATER 1
MTTF=26280
Q=5,707E-05
Sub-system MAIN ENG1 See page 3 Page 7 of 49 
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GENEDIESEL 1
Engine Failure
Page 25
Q=0,0003272
GENERATOR1
Generator Does Not
Produce Electircity
Page 26
Q=0
GENERATOR WIRING 1
Electrical Wiring
Failure
GENERATOR 
WIRING 1
MTTF=26280
Q=5,707E-05
Sub-system GENSET1 See page 5
Page 8 of 49 
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MAIN SWITCHES
Main Switches
Failure
MAIN SWITCHES
MTTF=26280
Q=1,903E-05
SEC BOARD SWITCHES
Section Boards'
Swithes Failure
SEC BOARD  
SWITCHES
MTTF=26280
Q=1,903E-05
SYNC UNIT
Syncrontion Unit
Failure
SYNC UNIT
MTTF=52560
Q=0
Sub-system MAIN SWITCH BOARD See page 5
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STEERING GEAR SECTION BOARD
Electric Supply
Problem on S/G
Section Board
STEERING GEAR 
SECTION BOARD
MTTF=26280
Q=1,903E-05
NAVIGATIONAL ASSETS SECTION BOARD
Electric Supply
Problem on
Navigational Assets
Section Board
NAVIGATIONAL 
ASSETS SECTION  
BOARD
MTTF=13140
Q=5,707E-05
ENGINE ROOM SECTİON BOARD
Electric Supply
Problem on Engine
Room Section Board
ENGINE ROOM 
SECTİON BOARD
MTTF=26280
Q=5,707E-05
Sub-system SECTION BOARDS See page 5
Page 10 of 49 
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EMER BATTERIES
Battery Voltage Low
EMER BATTERIES
MTTF=13140
Q=4,756E-05
EMER SUPPLY WIRINGS
Emergency Wiring
Failure
EMER SUPPLY  
WIRINGS
MTTF=26280
Q=9,513E-06
Sub-system EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY See page 5
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FIXED WATER DISCHARGE SYSTEM
Water Discharge
Ejector Does Not
Function
FIXED WATER  
DISCHARGE  
SYSTEM
MTTF=17520
Q=9,512E-05
FIRE PUMP ELEC MOTOR 1
Fire Pump Electric
Motor Does Not
Function
FIRE PUMP ELEC  
MOTOR 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
FIRE PUMP 1
Pump does not
function
FIRE PUMP 1
MTTF=17520
Q=0,004545
FIRE PUMP ELEC MOTOR 2
Fire Pump Electric
Motor Does Not
Function
FIRE PUMP ELEC  
MOTOR 2
MTTF=26280
Q=0,002278
FIRE PUMP 2
Pump does not
function
FIRE PUMP 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
FIRE FIGHTING PIPING
Leakage on
Fire-Figthing Piping
FIRE FIGHTING  
PIPING
MTTF=13140
Q=3,805E-05
SUBMERSIBLE ELECTRICAL PUMP
Submersible Electric
Pump Does Not
Function
SUBMERSIBLE  
ELECTRICAL  
PUMP
MTTF=26280
Q=0,001823
Sub-system FIRE FIGHTING & WATER DISCHARGE SYSTEM See page 6
Page 12 of 49 
SHIP RELIABILITY 
67 
  
Reliability Block Diagrams 
 
 
DO TRANSFER PUMP ELECTRIC MOTOR
DO Transfer Pump
Electric Motor Does
Not Function
DO TRANSFER 
PUMP ELECTRIC 
MOTOR
MTTF=26280
Q=0,001823
DO TRANSFER PUMP
DO Transfer Pump
Does Not Function
DO TRANSFER 
PUMP
MTTF=26280
Q=0,0009124
DO TRANSFER HAND PUMP
DO Transfer Hand
Pump Does Not
Function
DO TRANSFER 
HAND PUMP
MTTF=26280
Q=0,0003804
DO TRANSFER SYSTEM PIPING
Leakage on DO
Transfer System
Piping
DO TRANSFER 
SYSTEM PIPING
MTTF=17520
Q=0,0001141
Sub-system DO TRA SYS See page 6
Page 13 of 49 
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PORTHOLES
Tigthness Problem
on Portholes
PORTHOLES
MTTF=10512
Q=1,903E-05
HATCHWAYS
Tigthness Problem
on Hatchways
HATCHWAYS
MTTF=13140
Q=5,327E-05
Sub-system W/T DEPTS See page 6
Page 14 of 49 
SHIP RELIABILITY 
69 
  
Reliability Block Diagrams 
 
 
S/G PUMP ELEC MOTOR1
Electric Motor
Failure
S/G PUMP ELEC 
MOTOR1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
S/G HYD PUMP1
Hydraulic Pump
Failure
S/G HYD PUMP1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
S/G PUMP ELEC MOTOR2
Electric Motor
Failure
S/G PUMP ELEC 
MOTOR2
MTTF=26280
Q=0,001823
S/G HYD PUMP2
Hydraulic Pump
Failure
S/G HYD PUMP2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
Sub-system S/G PUMPS See page 4
Page 15 of 49 
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S/G HYD SYS PUMP ON BRIDGE
S/G Hydraulic Pump
Does Not Function
S/G HYD SYS 
PUMP ON BRIDGE
MTTF=26280
Q=0,0004564
S/G HYD PUMP IN S/G ROOM
S/G Hyd Pump Does
Not Function in S/G
Room
S/G HYD PUMP IN  
S/G ROOM
MTTF=52560
Q=0
Sub-system S/G HYD SYS See page 4
Page 16 of 49 
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S/G SELENOID VALVE GROUP 1
S/G Selenoid Valve
Group 1 Failure
S/G SELENOID 
VALVE GROUP 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
S/G SELENOID VALVE GROUP 2
S/G Selenoid Valve
Group 2 Failure
S/G SELENOID 
VALVE GROUP 2
MTTF=26280
Q=3,805E-05
S/G HYD PISTON 1
S/G Hydraulic
Piston 1 Failure
S/G HYD PISTON 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
S/G HYD PISTON 2
S/G Hydraulic
Piston 2 Failure
S/G HYD PISTON 2
MTTF=26280
Q=9,512E-05
Sub-system S/G ROOM COMPONENTS See page 4
Page 17 of 49 
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MAIN ENG FUELSRVC PUMP1
Fuel Service Pump
Failure
No Fuel at inlet of filter
MAIN ENG FUEL  
SRVC PUMP1
MTTF=26280
Q=0,0002283
MAIN ENG FUEL PUMP1
Bosch Type Fuel
Pump Failure
MAIN ENG FUEL  
PUMP1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG DUBLEX FUEL FILT A1
Fuel Filter Clogged
MAIN ENG 
DUBLEX FILTER  
A1
MTTF=26280
Q=5,708E-06
MAIN ENG DUBLEX FUEL FILT B1
Fuel Filter Clogged
MAIN ENG 
DUBLEX FUEL  
FILT B1
MTTF=26280
Q=5,708E-06
MAIN ENG INJECTORS1
Some injectors do
not spray fuel
MAIN ENG 
INJECTORS1
MTTF=17520
Q=9,512E-05
MAIN ENG PIPING FUEL SYS1
Leakage on fuel
pipes and
connections
MAIN ENG PIPING 
FUEL SYS1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
Sub-system MAIN ENG FUEL SYSTEM1 See page 7
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MAIN ENG LUB OIL PUMP1
Lubricating Oil
Pump Failure
MAIN ENG LUB 
OIL PUMP1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG FILTER OIL1
Oil Filter Clogged
MAIN ENG 
FILTER OIL1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG PIPING OIL1
Leakage at Oil
System Piping
MAIN ENG PIPING  
OIL1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG SUMP OIL LEVEL1
Lub Oil level Low
MAIN ENG SUMP  
OIL LEVEL1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG MAIN BEARINGS1
Main Bearings Worn
MAIN ENG MAIN  
BEARINGS1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG CON ROD BEARINGS1
Connecting Rod
Bearings Worn
MAIN ENG CON  
ROD BEARINGS1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG LUB OIL TEMP1
Lub Oil Temp High
Page 21
Q=0
Sub-system MAIN ENG LUBOIL SYS1 See page 7 Page 19 of 49 
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MAIN ENG SEA WATER1
Sea Water Supply
Loss
Page 24
Q=0
MAIN ENG F/W HEX1
F/W HEX Clogged
MAIN ENG F/W  
HEX1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG F/W LEVEL1
F/W Level Low
MAIN ENG F/W  
LEVEL1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG THERMOSTAT1
Thermostat Stucked
Closed
MAIN ENG 
THERMOSTAT1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG F/W PUMP1
F/W Pump Failure
MAIN ENG F/W  
PUMP1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
Sub-system MAIN ENG COOLING WATER1 See page 7
Page 20 of 49 
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MAIN ENG LUB OIL HEX1
Lub Oil HEX
Clogged
MAIN ENG LUB 
OIL HEX1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG SEA WATER1
Sea Water Supply
Loss
Page 24
Q=0
MAIN ENG SUMP OIL LEVEL1
Lub Oil level Low
MAIN ENG SUMP 
OIL LEVEL1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
Sub-system MAIN ENG LUB OIL TEMP1 See pages 7,19
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MAIN ENG AIR FILTER1
Air Filter Clogged
MAIN ENG AIR 
FILTER1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG SUPERCHARGER1
Supercharger Failure
MAIN ENG 
SUPERCHARGER1
MTTF=26280
Q=0,001823
Sub-system MAIN ENG CHARGE AIR SYSTEM1 See page 7
Page 22 of 49 
SHIP RELIABILITY 
77 
  
Reliability Block Diagrams 
 
 
MAIN ENG START BATTERIES1
Battery Voltage Low
MAIN ENG START 
BATTERIES1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG START MOTOR 1
Start Motor Failure
MAIN ENG START 
MOTOR 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG START SWITCH 1
Start Switch Failure
MAIN ENG START 
SWITCH 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG START SYS WIRING 1
Start System Wiring
Failure
MAIN ENG START 
SYS WIRING 1
MTTF=26280
Q=7,61E-06
Sub-system MAIN ENG START SYS1 See page 7
Page 23 of 49 
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MAIN ENG S/W SUCTION VALVE1
Suction Valve
Stucked Closed
MAIN ENG S/W 
SUCTION VALVE1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG S/W PUMP1
S/W Pump Failure
MAIN ENG S/W 
PUMP1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG EMER S/W SUPPLY1
Emergency Sea
Water Supply Loss
MAIN ENG EMER 
S/W SUPPLY1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG S/W PIPING1
Leakage on S/W
Piping
MAIN ENG S/W 
PIPING1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
Sub-system MAIN ENG SEA WATER1 See pages 20,21
Page 24 of 49 
SHIP RELIABILITY 
79 
  
Reliability Block Diagrams 
 
 
GENSET FUEL SYS1
No Fuel Supply
Page 27
Q=0,0001065
GENSET LUB OIL SYS1
Lub Oil Pressure
Low
Page 28
Q=7,597E-06
GENSET COOLING WATER1
Fresh Water Temp
High
Page 29
Q=0,0001598
GENSET AIR SYS1
Air Filter Clogged
GENSET AIR SYS1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
G EN SET STA R T SYS1
Starter Failure
Page 30
Q=3,805E-06
G EN SET A LA R M  SYS1
Alarm Sys tem
Failure
GENSET ALARM  
SYS1
MTTF=26280
Q=1,903E-05
G ENSET LUB OI L MI XED WI TH WATER 1
Water Mixed into
Lub Oil
GENSET LUB OIL  
MIXED WITH  
WATER 1
MTTF=26280
Q=3,805E-05
GENSET LUB OIL TEMP 1
Lub Oil Temp High
Page 39
Q=7,597E-06
Sub-system GENEDIESEL 1 See page 8 Page 25 of 49 
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GENSET SLIP RING1
GENSET1 Slip Ring
Failure
GENSET SLIP 
RING1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET BRUSHES1
GENSET 1 Brush
Failure
GENSET 
BRUSHES1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET EXCITING CURRENT 1
GENSET 1 No
Exciting Current
GENSET 
EXCITING 
CURRENT 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
Sub-system GENERATOR1 See page 8
Page 26 of 49 
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GENSET FUELSRVCPUMP 1
Fuel Service Pump
Failure
No Fuel at Inlet of Filter
GENSET 
FUELSRVCPUMP 
1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET DUBLEX FILTER A1
Dublex Filter
Clogged
GENSET DUBLEX 
FILTER A1
MTTF=26280
Q=5,708E-06
GENSET DUBLEX FILTER B1
Dublex Filter
Clogged
GENSET DUBLEX 
FILTER B1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET FUEL PUMP1
Bosch Type Fuel
Pump Failure
GENSET FUEL 
PUMP1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET INJECTORS1
Some Injectors do
not spray fuel
GENSET 
INJECTORS1
MTTF=26280
Q=9,512E-05
GENSET PIPING FUEL 1
Leakage on fuel
pipes and
connections
GENSET PIPING 
FUEL 1
MTTF=26280
Q=1,142E-05
Sub-system GENSET FUEL SYS1 See page 25
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GENSET SUMP OIL LEVEL1
Lub Oil level Low
GENSET SUMP 
OIL LEVEL1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET OIL FILTER 1
Oil Filter clogged
GENSET OIL 
FILTER 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET LUB OIL TEMP 1
Lub Oil Temp High
Page 39
Q=7,597E-06
GENSET LUB OIL PUMP 1
Lubricating Oil
Pump Failure
GENSET LUB OIL 
PUMP 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET MAIN BEARINGS 1
Main Bearings Worn
GENSET MAIN 
BEARINGS 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET CON ROD BEARINGS 1
Connecting Rod
Bearings Worn
GENSET CON 
ROD BEARINGS 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET PIPING OIL 1
Leakage at Oil
System Piping
GENSET PIPING  
OIL 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
Sub-system GENSET LUB OIL SYS1 See page 25 Page 28 of 49 
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GENSET F/W HEX 1
F/W HEX Clogged
GENSET F/W HEX  
1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET F/W LEVEL 1
F/W Level Low
GENSET F/W  
LEVEL 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET THERMOSTAT 1
Thermostat Stucked
Closed
GENSET  
THERMOSTAT 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET F/W PUMP 1
F/W Pump Failure
GENSET F/W  
PUMP 1
MTTF=26280
Q=0,0001522
GENSET SEA WATER1
Sea Water Supply
Loss
Page 40
Q=7,597E-06
Sub-system GENSET COOLING WATER1 See page 25
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GENSET START BATTERIES 1
Battery Voltage Low
GENSET START  
BATTERIES 1
MTTF=26280
Q=3,805E-06
GENSET START MOTOR 1
Start Motor Failure
GENSET START  
MOTOR 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET START SWITCH 1
Start Switch Failure
GENSET START  
SWITCH 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET START SYS WIRING 1
Start System Wiring
Failure
GENSET START  
SYS WIRING 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
Sub-system GENSET START SYS1 See page 25
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MAIN ENG FUEL SYSTEM2
No Fuel Supply
Page 32
Q=0,0009656
MAIN ENG LUBOIL SYS2
Lub.Oil Pressure
Low
Page 33
Q=1,522E-05
M A I N  E N G  C O O L I NG  WATER2
Fresh Water Temp
High
Page 34
Q=0,0002245
MAIN ENG LUB OIL TEMP2
Lub Oil Temp High
Page 35
Q=1,522E-05
MAI N ENG CHARGE AI R SYSTEM2
Air Supply Failure
Page 36
Q=3,805E-06
MAIN ENG START SYS2
Starter Failure
Page 37
Q=0,0004621
MAIN ENG ALARM SYS2
Alarm Syatem
Failure
MAIN ENG  
ALARM SYS2
MTTF=10512
Q=6,468E-05
MAI N ENG LUB OI L MI XED WATER 2
Water Mixed into
Lub Oil
MAIN ENG LUB  
OIL MIXED  
WATER 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
Sub-system MAIN ENG2 See page 3 Page 31 of 49 
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MAIN ENG FUELSRVC PUMP2
Fuel Service Pump
Failure
No Fuel at inlet of filter
MAIN ENG 
FUELSRVC 
PUMP2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG FUEL PUMP2
Bosch Type Fuel
Pump Failure
MAIN ENG FUEL  
PUMP2
MTTF=26280
Q=0,0009124
MAIN ENG DUBLEX FUEL FILT A2
Fuel Filter Clogged
MAIN ENG 
DUBLEX FUEL  
FILT A2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG DUBLEX FUEL FILT B2
Fuel Filter Clogged
MAIN ENG 
DUBLEX FUEL  
FILT B2
MTTF=26280
Q=5,708E-06
MAIN ENG INJECTORS2
Some injectors do
not spray fuel
MAIN ENG 
INJECTORS2
MTTF=26280
Q=3,805E-05
MAIN ENG PIPING FUEL SYS2
Leakage on fuel
pipes and
connections
MAIN ENG PIPING 
FUEL SYS2
MTTF=26280
Q=1,522E-05
Sub-system MAIN ENG FUEL SYSTEM2 See page 31
Page 32 of 49 
SHIP RELIABILITY 
87 
  
Reliability Block Diagrams 
 
 
MAIN ENG LUB OIL PUMP2
Lubricating Oil
Pump Failure
MAIN ENG LUB 
OIL PUMP2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG FILTER OIL2
Oil Filter Clogged
MAIN ENG 
FILTER OIL2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG PIPING OIL2
Leakage at Oil
System Piping
MAIN ENG PIPING  
OIL2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG SUMP OIL LEVEL2
Lub Oil level Low
MAIN ENG SUMP  
OIL LEVEL2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG MAIN BEARINGS2
Main Bearings Worn
MAIN ENG MAIN  
BEARINGS2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG CON ROD BEARINGS2
Connecting Rod
Bearings Worn
MAIN ENG CON  
ROD BEARINGS2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG LUB OIL TEMP2
Lub Oil Temp High
Page 35
Q=1,522E-05
Sub-system MAIN ENG LUBOIL SYS2 See page 31 Page 33 of 49 
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MAIN ENG SEA WATER2
Sea Water Supply
Loss
Page 38
Q=1,522E-05
MAIN ENG F/W HEX2
F/W HEX Clogged
MAIN ENG F/W  
HEX2
MTTF=26280
Q=5,707E-05
MAIN ENG F/W LEVEL2
F/W Level Low
MAIN ENG F/W  
LEVEL2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG THERMOSTAT2
Thermostat Stucked
Closed
MAIN ENG 
THERMOSTAT2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG F/W PUMP2
F/W Pump Failure
MAIN ENG F/W  
PUMP2
MTTF=26280
Q=0,0001522
Sub-system MAIN ENG COOLING WATER2 See page 31
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MAIN ENG LUB OIL HEX2
Lub Oil HEX
Clogged
MAIN ENG LUB 
OIL HEX2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG SEA WATER2
Sea Water Supply
Loss
Page 38
Q=1,522E-05
MAIN ENG SUMP OIL LEVEL2
Lub Oil level Low
MAIN ENG SUMP 
OIL LEVEL2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
Sub-system MAIN ENG LUB OIL TEMP2 See pages 31,33
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MAIN ENG AIR FILTER2
Air Filter Clogged
MAIN ENG AIR 
FILTER2
MTTF=26280
Q=3,805E-06
MAIN ENG SUPERCHARGER2
Supercharger Failure
MAIN ENG 
SUPERCHARGER2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
Sub-system MAIN ENG CHARGE AIR SYSTEM2 See page 31
Page 36 of 49 
SHIP RELIABILITY 
91 
  
Reliability Block Diagrams 
 
 
MAIN ENG START BATTERIES2
Battery Voltage Low
MAIN ENG START 
BATTERIES2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG START MOTOR 2
Start Motor Failure
MAIN ENG START 
MOTOR 2
MTTF=26280
Q=0,0004564
MAIN ENG START SWITCH 2
Start Switch Failure
MAIN ENG START 
SWITCH 2
MTTF=26280
Q=5,708E-06
MAIN ENG START SYS WIRING 2
Start System Wiring
Failure
MAIN ENG START 
SYS WIRING 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
Sub-system MAIN ENG START SYS2 See page 31
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MAIN ENG S/W SUCTION VALVE2
Suction Valve
Stucked Closed
MAIN ENG S/W 
SUCTION VALVE2
MTTF=26280
Q=1,522E-05
MAIN ENG S/W PUMP2
S/W Pump Failure
MAIN ENG S/W 
PUMP2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG EMER S/W SUPPLY2
Emergency Sea
Water Supply Loss
MAIN ENG EMER 
S/W SUPPLY2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG S/W PIPING2
Leakage on S/W
Piping
MAIN ENG S/W 
PIPING2
MTTF=17520
Q=1,522E-05
Sub-system MAIN ENG SEA WATER2 See pages 34,35
Page 38 of 49 
SHIP RELIABILITY 
93 
  
Reliability Block Diagrams 
 
 
GENSET SEA WATER1
Sea Water Supply
Loss
Page 40
Q=7,597E-06
GENSET LUB OIL HEX1
Lub Oil HEX
Clogged
GENSET LUB OIL 
HEX1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET SUMP OIL LEVEL1
Lub Oil level Low
GENSET SUMP 
OIL LEVEL1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
Sub-system GENSET LUB OIL TEMP 1 See pages 25,28
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GENSET S/W SUCTION VALVE 1
Suction Valve
Stcked Closed
GENSET S/W 
SUCTION VALVE 
1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET S/W PUMP 1
S/W Pump Failure
GENSET S/W 
PUMP 1
MTTF=26280
Q=1,903E-05
GENSET EMER S/W SUPPLY 1
Emergency Sea
Water Supply Loss
GENSET EMER 
S/W SUPPLY 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET S/W PIPING 1
Leakage on S/W
Piping
GENSET S/W 
PIPING 1
MTTF=26325
Q=7,597E-06
Sub-system GENSET SEA WATER1 See pages 29,39
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GENEDIESEL 2
Engine Failure
Page 42
Q=0,008614
GENERATOR2
Generator Does Not
Produce Electircity
Page 43
Q=0
GENERATOR WIRING 2
Electrical Wiring
Failure
GENERATOR 
WIRING 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
Sub-system GENSET2 See page 5
Page 41 of 49 
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Reliability Block Diagrams 
 
 
GENSET FUEL SYS2
No Fuel Supply
Page 44
Q=0,00435
GENSET LUB OIL SYS2
Lub Oil Pressure
Low
Page 45
Q=8,941E-05
GENSET COOLING WATER2
Fresh Water Temp
High
Page 46
Q=0,004191
GENSET AIR SYS2
Air Filter Clogged
GENSET AIR SYS2
MTTF=26280
Q=9,513E-06
GENSET START SYS2
Starter Failure
Page 47
Q=0
GENSET ALARM SYS2
Alarm Sys tem
Failure
GENSET ALARM  
SYS2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET LUB OI L MI XED WI TH WATER 2
Water Mixed into
Lub Oil
GENSET LUB OIL  
MIXED WITH  
WATER 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET LUB OIL TEMP 2
Lub Oil Temp High
Page 48
Q=8,371E-05
Sub-system GENEDIESEL 2 See page 41 Page 42 of 49 
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GENSET SLIP RING2
GENSET 2 Slip
Ring Failure
GENSET SLIP 
RING2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET BRUSHES2
GENSET 2 Brush
Failure
GENSET 
BRUSHES2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET EXCITING CURRENT 2
GENSET 2 No
Exciting Current
GENSET 
EXCITING 
CURRENT 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
Sub-system GENERATOR2 See page 41
Page 43 of 49 
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Reliability Block Diagrams 
 
 
GENSET FUELSRVCPUMP 2
Fuel Service Pump
Failure
No Fuel at Inlet of Filter
GENSET 
FUELSRVCPUMP 
2
MTTF=26280
Q=7,61E-05
GENSET DUBLEX FILTER A2
Dublex Filter
Clogged
GENSET DUBLEX 
FILTER A2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET DUBLEX FILTER B2
Dublex Filter
Clogged
GENSET DUBLEX 
FILTER B2
MTTF=26280
Q=5,708E-06
GENSET FUEL PUMP2
Bosch Type Fuel
Pump Failure
GENSET FUEL 
PUMP2
MTTF=17520
Q=0,004093
GENSET INJECTORS2
Some Injectors do
not spray fuel
GENSET 
INJECTORS2
MTTF=17520
Q=0,0001522
GENSET PIPING FUEL 2
Leakage on fuel
pipes and
connections
GENSET PIPING 
FUEL 2
MTTF=17520
Q=3,044E-05
Sub-system GENSET FUEL SYS2 See page 42
Page 44 of 49 
SHIP RELIABILITY 
99 
  
Reliability Block Diagrams 
 
 
GENSET SUMP OIL LEVEL2
Lub Oil level Low
GENSET SUMP 
OIL LEVEL2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET OIL FILTER 2
Oil Filter clogged
GENSET OIL 
FILTER 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET LUB OIL TEMP 2
Lub Oil Temp High
Page 48
Q=8,371E-05
GENSET LUB OIL PUMP 2
Lubricating Oil
Pump Failure
GENSET LUB OIL 
PUMP 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET MAIN BEARINGS 2
Main Bearings Worn
GENSET MAIN 
BEARINGS 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET CON ROD BEARINGS 2
Connecting Rod
Bearings Worn
GENSET CON 
ROD BEARINGS 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET PIPING OIL 2
Leakage at Oil
System Piping
GENSET PIPING  
OIL 2
MTTF=26280
Q=5,708E-06
Sub-system GENSET LUB OIL SYS2 See page 42 Page 45 of 49 
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GENSET F/W HEX 2
F/W HEX Clogged
GENSET F/W HEX  
2
MTTF=26280
Q=7,61E-05
GENSET F/W LEVEL 2
F/W Level Low
GENSET F/W  
LEVEL 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET THERMOSTAT 2
Thermostat Stucked
Closed
GENSET  
THERMOSTAT 2
MTTF=26280
Q=1,522E-05
GENSET F/W PUMP 2
F/W Pump Failure
GENSET F/W  
PUMP 2
MTTF=17520
Q=0,004093
GENSET SEA WATER2
Sea Water Supply
Loss
Page 49
Q=7,61E-06
Sub-system GENSET COOLING WATER2 See page 42
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GENSET START BATTERIES 2
Battery Voltage Low
GENSET START  
BATTERIES 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET START MOTOR 2
Start Motor Failure
GENSET START  
MOTOR 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET START SWITCH 2
Start Switch Failure
GENSET START  
SWITCH 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET START SYS WIRING 2
Start System Wiring
Failure
GENSET START  
SYS WIRING 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
Sub-system GENSET START SYS2 See page 42
Page 47 of 49 
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GENSET SEA WATER2
Sea Water Supply
Loss
Page 49
Q=7,61E-06
GENSET LUB OIL HEX2
Lub Oil HEX
Clogged
GENSET LUB OIL 
HEX2
MTTF=26280
Q=7,61E-05
GENSET SUMP OIL LEVEL2
Lub Oil level Low
GENSET SUMP 
OIL LEVEL2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
Sub-system GENSET LUB OIL TEMP 2 See pages 42,45
Page 48 of 49 
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Reliability Block Diagrams 
 
 
GENSET S/W SUCTION VALVE 2
Suction Valve
Stcked Closed
GENSET S/W 
SUCTION VALVE 
2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET S/W PUMP 2
S/W Pump Failure
GENSET S/W 
PUMP 2
MTTF=26280
Q=1,903E-05
GENSET EMER S/W SUPPLY 2
Emergency Sea
Water Supply Loss
GENSET EMER 
S/W SUPPLY 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET S/W PIPING 2
Leakage on S/W
Piping
GENSET S/W 
PIPING 2
MTTF=26280
Q=7,61E-06
Sub-system GENSET SEA WATER2 See pages 46,48
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Fault Tree Diagrams 
 
SHIP UNAVAILABLE
Q=0,0003726
Ship cannot
accomplish
mission
PROPULSION SYSTEM
Q=3,867E-06
Page 2
Propulsion
System Failure
STEERING GEAR
Q=3,425E-05
Page 3
Steering Gear
System Failure
ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM
Q=9,844E-05
Page 4
Electric Power
System Failure
DAMAGE CONTROL SYSTEM
Q=0,000236
Page 5
Damage Control
System Failure
1 
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PROPULSION SYSTEM
Q=3,867E-06
1
Propulsion
System Failure
GT336 GT337
MAIN ENGINE NO:1
Page 16
Main Engine
No:1 Failure
MAIN ENGINE NO:2
Page 17
Main Engine
No:2 Failure
2 
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STEERING GEAR
Q=3,425E-05
1
Steering Gear
System Failure
S/G SYSTEMS
S/G Failure
S/ G  RO O M  CO M PO NENETS
S/G Room
Components
Failures
S/G PIPING
Leakage on S/G
Piping
S/G PIPING
MTTF=17520
Q=3,425E-05
GT332 GT333MANUAL S/G
Manual S/G
Failure
MANUAL S/G
MTTF=52560
Q=0
S/G SELENOID VALVES
Selenoid Valve
Failure
S/G HYD PISTONS
Hydraulic Piston
Failure
S/G PUMPS
Pump Failures
S/G SEC BOARD
S/G Section
Board Electric
Supply Failure
STEERING  
GEAR 
SECTION  
BOARD
MTTF=26280
Q=1,903E-05
PUMP UNIT 1
Pump Unit
Failure
PUMP UNIT 2
Pump Unit
Failure
S/ G  PUM P ELEC M O TO R 1
S/G Pump
Electric Motor
Failure
S/G PUMP  
ELEC MOTOR1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
S/G HYD PUMP 1
S/G Hydraulşc
Pump Failure
S/G HYD  
PUMP1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
S/ G  PUM P ELEC M O TO R 2
S/G Pump
Electric Motor
Failure
S/G PUMP  
ELEC MOTOR2
MTTF=26280
Q=0,001823
S/G HYD PUMP 2
S/G Hydraulşc
Pump Failure
S/G HYD  
PUMP2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
S/ G  SELENO I D VALVE G RO UP 1
Selenoid Valve
Failure
S/G SELENOID  
VALVE GROUP  
1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
S/ G  SELENO I D VALVE G RO UP 2
Selenoid Valve
Failure
S/G SELENOID  
VALVE GROUP  
2
MTTF=26280
Q=3,805E-05
S/G HYD PISTON 1
Hydraulic Piston
Failure
S/G HYD  
PISTON 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
S/G HYD PISTON 2
Hydraulic Piston
Failure
S/G HYD  
PISTON 2
MTTF=26280
Q=9,512E-05
S/ G  HYD SYS PUM P O N BRI DG E
Hydraulic manual
pump failure
S/G HYD SYS  
PUMP ON  
BRIDGE
MTTF=26280
Q=0,0004564
S/ G  HYD PUM P I N S/ G  RO O M
Hydraulic Manual
Pump Failure
S/G HYD  
PUMP IN S/G  
ROOM
MTTF=52560
Q=0
S/G HYDRAULIC SYS
Hydraulic S/G
Failure
S/G
S/G Pump or
Electric Supply
Failure
3 
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ELECTRI C PO WER SYSTEM
Q =9, 844E- 05
1
Elec tric  Power
Sy s tem  Failure
GENSETS
Gens ets  produce
no e lec tricity
M AI N  SWI TCHBO ARD
M ain
Swi tc hboard
fa i lure
PRI O R BO ARDS
Boards  Power
Supply  Fa ilure
ELECTRI CAL WI RI NG
Elec tric a l  Wirng
Fai lure
ELEC WIRING 
NETWORK
M TTF=17520
Q=5,707E-05
GENSET 1
Gens et produce
no e lec tricity
GENSET 2
Gens et produce
no e lec tricity
M AI N SWI TCHES
Swi tc h Fa i lure
M AIN 
SWITCHES
M TTF=26280
Q=1,903E-05
SEC BO ARD SWI TCHES
Swi tc h Fa i lure
SEC BOARD 
SWITCHES
M TTF=26280
Q=1,903E-05
SYNCRO NATI O N UNI T
Sy nc ronation
Uni t Fa i lure
SYNC UNIT
M TTF=52560
Q=0
SECTI O N BO ARDS
Sec tion Board
Fai lure
BO ARD'S EM ERG ENCY SUPPLY
Em ergency
Power Supply
Fa i lure
GEN DIESEL 1
Page 6
Engine Fa ilure
GENERATOR 1
Generator does
not produce
elec tricity
G ENERATO R WI RI NG  1
Elec tric a l  Wirng
Fai lure
GENERATOR 
WIRING 1
M TTF=26280
Q=5,707E-05
G ENSET SLI P RI NG  1
Sl ip  ring  fa ilure
GENSET SLIP 
RING1
M TTF=52560
Q=0
G ENSET BRUSHES 1
Brus h fa i lure
GENSET 
BRUSHES1
M TTF=52560
Q=0
G ENSET EXCI TI NG  CURRENT
No ex c i ting
c urrent
GENSET 
EXCITING 
CURRENT 1
M TTF=52560
Q=0
GEN DIESEL 2
Page 11
Engine Fa ilure
GENERATOR 2
Generator does
not produce
elec tricity
G ENERATO R WI RI NG  2
Elec tric a l  Wirng
Fai lure
GENERATOR 
WIRING 2
M TTF=52560
Q=0
G ENSET SLI P RI NG  2
Sl ip  ring  fa ilure
GENSET SLIP 
RING2
M TTF=52560
Q=0
G ENSET BRUSHES 2
Brus h fa i lure
GENSET 
BRUSHES2
M TTF=52560
Q=0
G ENSET EXCI TI NG  CURRENT1
No ex c i ting
c urrent
GENSET 
EXCITING 
CURRENT 2
M TTF=52560
Q=0
NAVI G ATI O NAL ASSETS' SEC BO ARD
Sec tion board
e lec tric a l  failure
NAVIGATIONA
L ASSETS 
SECTION 
BOARD
M TTF=13140
Q=5,707E-05
ENG I NE RO O M  SEC BO ARD
Sec tion board
e lec tric a l  failure
ENGINE ROOM  
SECTİON 
BOARD
M TTF=26280
Q=5,707E-05
S/ G  SEC BO ARD
S/G Sec tion
Board Elec tric
Supply  Fa ilure
STEERING 
GEAR 
SECTION 
BOARD
M TTF=26280
Q=1,903E-05
EM ERG ENCY BATTERI ES
Battery  v o ltage
low
EM ER 
BATTERIES
M TTF=13140
Q=4,756E-05
EM ERG ENCY WI RI NG
Wiring fa ilure
EM ER SUPPLY 
WIRINGS
M TTF=26280
Q=9,513E-06
4 
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DAM AG E CO NTRO L SYSTEM
Q=0,000236
1
Damage Control
System Failure
FI RE FI G HTI NG  & WATER DI SCHARG E SYS
Fire Fighting and
Water Discharge
System Failure
WATER- TI G TH DEPTS
Water-tigth
Departments
Failure
DO TRANSFER SYS
Diesel Oil
Transfer System
Failure
PUMP UNITS
Pump Units
Failure
DI SCHARG E SYSTEM
Discharge
System Failure
FI RE FI G THI NG  SYS PI PI NG
Leakage on Fire
Figthing System
Piping
FIRE 
FIGHTING 
PIPING
MTTF=13140
Q=3,805E-05
PORTHOLES
Tigthness
Problem on
Portholes
PORTHOLES
MTTF=10512
Q=1,903E-05
HATCHWAYS
Tigthness
Problem on
Hatchways
HATCHWAYS
MTTF=13140
Q=5,327E-05
TRANSFER PUMPS
Transfer Pumps
Failure
DO  TRANSFER SYS PI PI NG
Leakage on
Piping System
DO TRANSFER  
SYSTEM  
PIPING
MTTF=17520
Q=0,0001141
GT338 GT339 FI XED WATER DI SCHARG E SYS
Fixed Water
Discharge
System Failure
FIXED WATER  
DISCHARGE  
SYSTEM
MTTF=17520
Q=9,512E-05
SUBM ERSI BLE ELECTRI CAL PUM P
Submersible
Pump Failure
SUBMERSIBLE  
ELECTRICAL  
PUMP
MTTF=26280
Q=0,001823
ELEC M OTOR 1
Electric Motor
Failure
FIRE PUMP  
ELEC MOTOR 
1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
FIRE PUMP 1
Pump Failure
FIRE PUMP 1
MTTF=17520
Q=0,004545
ELEC M OTOR 2
Electric Motor
Failure
FIRE PUMP  
ELEC MOTOR 
2
MTTF=26280
Q=0,002278
FIRE PUMP 2
Pump Failure
FIRE PUMP 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GT334 GT335
DO  TRA PUM P ELEC M O TO R
Electric Motor
Failure
DO TRANSFER  
PUMP 
ELECTRIC  
MOTOR
MTTF=26280
Q=0,001823
DO  TRANSFER PUM P
Pump Failure
DO TRANSFER  
PUMP
MTTF=26280
Q=0,0009124
DO  TRANSFER PUM P UNI T
DO Transfer
Pump Failure
DO TRA HAND PUMP
Hand Pump
Failure
DO TRANSFER  
HAND PUMP
MTTF=26280
Q=0,0003804
FIRE PUM P UNIT 1
Pump Unit
Failure
FIRE PUM P UNIT 2
Pump Unit
Failure
5 
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GEN DIESEL 1
4
Engine Failure
GENSET FUEL SYSTEM1
Page 7
Fuel Supply
Failure
GENSET LUB OIL TEMP 1
Page 8
Lubrication Oil
Temperature
High
G ENSET LUB O I L SYSTEM  1
Page 9
Lubrication Oil
Pressure Low
G ENSET CO O LI NG  WATER SYSTEM  1
Page 10
Cooling Water
Temperature
High
GENSET START SYS 1
Start System
Failure
GENSET AIR SYS 1
Charge air
supply failure
GENSET AIR  
SYS1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET ALARM  SYS 1
Engine alarm
system failure
GENSET 
ALARM SYS1
MTTF=26280
Q=1,903E-05
G ENSET LUB O I L M I XED WI TH WATER 1
Water mixed into
lub oil
GENSET LUB  
OIL MIXED  
WITH WATER  
1
MTTF=26280
Q=3,805E-05
G ENSET START  BATTERI ES 1
Battery voltage
low
GENSET 
START 
BATTERIES 1
MTTF=26280
Q=3,805E-06
G ENSET START M O TO R 1
Start Motor
failure
GENSET 
START 
MOTOR 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
G ENSET START SWI TCH 1
Start Switch
failure
GENSET 
START 
SWITCH 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
G ENSET START SYS WI RI NG  1
Start System
Wiring failure
GENSET 
START SYS  
WIRING 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
6 
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GENSET FUEL SYSTEM1
6
Fuel Supply
Failure
GENSET DUBLEX FILTERS1
Dublex Filters
Clogged
GENSET FUEL  SRVC PUM P 1
Fuel Service
Pump Failure No
fuel at fuel filter
inlet
GENSET 
FUELSRVCPU
MP 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET FUEL PUMP 1
Bosch Type Fuel
Pump Failure
GENSET FUEL 
PUMP1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET INJECTORS 1
Some Injectors
do not spray fuel
GENSET 
INJECTORS1
MTTF=26280
Q=9,512E-05
GENSET PIPING FUEL SYS 1
Fuel Leakage on
fuel piping
GENSET 
PIPING FUEL 1
MTTF=26280
Q=1,142E-05
GENSET DUBLEX FUEL FILT A1
Fuel Filter
Glogged
GENSET 
DUBLEX 
FILTER A1
MTTF=26280
Q=5,708E-06
GENSET DUBLEX FUEL FILT B1
Fuel Filter
Clogged
GENSET 
DUBLEX 
FILTER B1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
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GENSET LUB OIL TEMP 1
6,9
Lubrication Oil
Temperature
High
GENSET SEA WATER SYS 1
10
Sea water supply
loss
GENSET LUB OIL HEX 1
Lub Oil HEX
clogged
GENSET LUB  
OIL HEX1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET SUM P OIL LEVEL 1
Oil level is low
GENSET  
SUMP OIL 
LEVEL1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET S/W SUPPLY SYS 1
Sea water supply
loss
GENSET S/W PIPING 1
Leakage on S/W
Piping
GENSET S/W  
PIPING 1
MTTF=26325
Q=7,597E-06
GENSET S/W SUCTION VALVE 1
Suction Valve
stucked closed
GENSET S/W  
SUCTION 
VALVE 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET S/W PUMP 1
S/W Pump failure
GENSET S/W  
PUMP 1
MTTF=26280
Q=1,903E-05
GENSET S/W PUM P SUPPLY 1
Main Sea Water
System Failure
GENSET EM ERGENCY S/W SUPPLY 1
Emergency sea
water supply loss
GENSET  
EMER S/W  
SUPPLY 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
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GENSET LUB OIL SYSTEM  1
6
Lubrication Oil
Pressure Low
GENSET LUB OIL TEM P 1
Page 8
Lubrication Oil
Temperature
High
GENSET FILTER OIL 1
Oil Filter clogged
GENSET OIL 
FILTER 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET LUB OIL PUM P 1
Lub Oil Pump
Failure
GENSET LUB 
OIL PUMP 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET M AIN BEARINGS 1
Main Bearings
worn
GENSET MAIN 
BEARINGS 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET CON ROD BEARINGS 1
Connecting Rod
Bearings worn
GENSET CON 
ROD 
BEARINGS 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET LUB OIL PIPING SYS 1
Leakage on lub
oil piping system
GENSET 
PIPING OIL 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET SUM P OIL LEVEL 1
Oil level is low
GENSET 
SUMP OIL 
LEVEL1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
9 
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G ENSET CO O LI NG  WATER SYSTEM  1
6
Cooling Water
Temperature
High
GENSET S/W SUPPLY SYS 1
Sea water supply
loss
GENSET S/W PIPING 1
Leakage on S/W
Piping
GENSET S/W  
PIPING 1
MTTF=26325
Q=7,597E-06
G ENSET S/ W SUCTI O N VALVE 1
Suction Valve
stucked closed
GENSET S/W  
SUCTION 
VALVE 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET S/W PUMP 1
S/W Pump failure
GENSET S/W  
PUMP 1
MTTF=26280
Q=1,903E-05
G ENSET S/ W PUM P SUPPLY 1
Main Sea Water
System Failure
G ENSET EM ERG ENCY S/ W SUPPLY 1
Emergency sea
water supply loss
GENSET  
EMER S/W  
SUPPLY 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET SEA WATER SYS 1
8
Sea water supply
loss
G ENSET M AI N ENG  F/ W HEX 1
Fresh water HEX
clogged
GENSET F/W  
HEX 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET F/W LEVEL 1
Fresh Water
Level low
GENSET F/W  
LEVEL 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET THERM OSTAT 1
Thermostat
failure
GENSET  
THERMOSTAT  
1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET F/W PUMP 1
Fresh Water
Pump failure
GENSET F/W  
PUMP 1
MTTF=26280
Q=0,0001522
10 
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GEN DIESEL 2
4
Engine Failure
G ENSET FUEL SYSTEM 2
Page 12
Fuel Supply
Failure
G ENSET LUB O I L TEM P 2
Page 13
Lubrication Oil
Temperature
High
G ENSET LUB O I L SYSTEM  2
Page 14
Lubrication Oil
Pressure Low
G ENSET CO O LI NG  WATER SYSTEM  2
Page 15
Cooling Water
Temperature
High
GENSET START SYS 2
Start System
Failure
GENSET AIR SYS 2
Charge air
supply failure
GENSET AIR  
SYS2
MTTF=26280
Q=9,513E-06
GENSET ALARM  SYS 2
Engine alarm
system failure
GENSET 
ALARM SYS2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
G ENSET LUB O I L M I XED WI TH WATER 2
Water mixed into
lub oil
GENSET LUB  
OIL MIXED 
WITH WATER 
2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
G ENSET START  BATTERI ES 2
Battery voltage
low
GENSET 
START 
BATTERIES 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
G ENSET START M O TO R 2
Start Motor
failure
GENSET 
START 
MOTOR 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
G ENSET START SWI TCH 2
Start Switch
failure
GENSET 
START 
SWITCH 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
G ENSET START SYS WI RI NG  2
Start System
Wiring failure
GENSET 
START SYS  
WIRING 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
11 
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GENSET FUEL SYSTEM2
11
Fuel Supply
Failure
GENSET DUBLEX FILTERS2
Dublex Filters
Clogged
GENSET FUEL  SRVC PUM P 2
Fuel Service
Pump Failure No
fuel at fuel filter
inlet
GENSET 
FUELSRVCPU
MP 2
MTTF=26280
Q=7,61E-05
GENSET FUEL PUMP 2
Bosch Type Fuel
Pump Failure
GENSET FUEL 
PUMP2
MTTF=17520
Q=0,004093
GENSET INJECTORS 2
Some Injectors
do not spray fuel
GENSET 
INJECTORS2
MTTF=17520
Q=0,0001522
GENSET PIPING FUEL SYS 2
Fuel Leakage on
fuel piping
GENSET 
PIPING FUEL 2
MTTF=17520
Q=3,044E-05
GENSET DUBLEX FUEL FILT A2
Fuel Filter
Glogged
GENSET 
DUBLEX 
FILTER A2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET DUBLEX FUEL FILT B2
Fuel Filter
Clogged
GENSET 
DUBLEX 
FILTER B2
MTTF=26280
Q=5,708E-06
12 
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GENSET LUB OIL TEMP 2
11,14
Lubrication Oil
Temperature
High
GENSET SEA WATER SYS 2
15
Sea water supply
loss
GENSET LUB OIL HEX 2
Lub Oil HEX
clogged
GENSET LUB  
OIL HEX2
MTTF=26280
Q=7,61E-05
GENSET SUM P OIL LEVEL 2
Oil level is low
GENSET  
SUMP OIL 
LEVEL2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET S/W SUPPLY SYS 2
Sea water supply
loss
GENSET S/W PIPING 2
Leakage on S/W
Piping
GENSET  
PIPING OIL 2
MTTF=26280
Q=5,708E-06
GENSET S/W SUCTION VALVE 2
Suction Valve
stucked closed
GENSET S/W  
SUCTION 
VALVE 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET S/W PUMP 2
S/W Pump failure
GENSET S/W  
PUMP 2
MTTF=26280
Q=1,903E-05
GENSET S/W PUM P SUPPLY 2
Main Sea Water
System Failure
GENSET EM ERGENCY S/W SUPPLY 2
Emergency sea
water supply loss
GENSET  
EMER S/W  
SUPPLY 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
13 
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Fault Tree Diagrams 
 
GENSET LUB OIL SYSTEM  2
11
Lubrication Oil
Pressure Low
GENSET LUB OIL TEM P 2
Page 13
Lubrication Oil
Temperature
High
GENSET FILTER OIL 2
Oil Filter clogged
GENSET OIL 
FILTER 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET LUB OIL PUM P 2
Lub Oil Pump
Failure
GENSET LUB 
OIL PUMP 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET M AIN BEARINGS 2
Main Bearings
worn
GENSET MAIN 
BEARINGS 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET CON ROD BEARINGS 2
Connecting Rod
Bearings worn
GENSET CON 
ROD 
BEARINGS 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET LUB OIL PIPING SYS 2
Leakage on lub
oil piping system
GENSET 
PIPING OIL 2
MTTF=26280
Q=5,708E-06
GENSET SUM P OIL LEVEL 2
Oil level is low
GENSET 
SUMP OIL 
LEVEL2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
14 
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G ENSET CO O LI NG  WATER SYSTEM  2
11
Cooling Water
Temperature
High
GENSET S/W SUPPLY SYS 2
Sea water supply
loss
GENSET S/W PIPING 2
Leakage on S/W
Piping
GENSET  
PIPING OIL 2
MTTF=26280
Q=5,708E-06
G ENSET S/ W SUCTI O N VALVE 2
Suction Valve
stucked closed
GENSET S/W  
SUCTION 
VALVE 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET S/W PUMP 2
S/W Pump failure
GENSET S/W  
PUMP 2
MTTF=26280
Q=1,903E-05
G ENSET S/ W PUM P SUPPLY 2
Main Sea Water
System Failure
G ENSET EM ERG ENCY S/ W SUPPLY 2
Emergency sea
water supply loss
GENSET  
EMER S/W  
SUPPLY 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET SEA WATER SYS 2
13
Sea water supply
loss
G ENSET M AI N ENG  F/ W HEX 2
Fresh water HEX
clogged
GENSET F/W  
HEX 2
MTTF=26280
Q=7,61E-05
GENSET F/W LEVEL 2
Fresh Water
Level low
GENSET F/W  
LEVEL 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
GENSET THERM OSTAT 2
Thermostat
failure
GENSET  
THERMOSTAT  
2
MTTF=26280
Q=1,522E-05
GENSET F/W PUMP 2
Fresh Water
Pump failure
GENSET F/W  
PUMP 2
MTTF=17520
Q=0,004093
15 
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Fault Tree Diagrams 
 
M AIN ENGINE NO:1
2
Main Engine
No:1 Failure
M AI N ENG I NE FUEL SYSTEM 1
Page 18
Fuel Supply
Failure
M AI N ENG I NE LUB O I L SYSTEM 1
Page 19
Lubrication Oil
Pressure Low
M AI N ENG I NE CO O LI NG  WATER SYSTEM1
Page 20
Cooling Water
Temperature
High
M AI N ENG  LUB O I L TEM P 1
Page 21
Lubrication Oil
Temperature
High
M AI N ENG  CHARG E AI R SYS 1
Charge Air
Supply Failure
M AIN ENG START SYS 1
Start System
Failure
M AI N ENG  ALARM  SYS 1
Alarm System
Failure
MAIN ENG 
ALARM SYS1
MTTF=17520
Q=3,805E-05
M AI N ENG  WATER M I XED I NTO  LUB OIL1
Water Mixed into
Lubrication Oil
MAIN ENG LUB  
OIL MIXED  
WATER 1
MTTF=26280
Q=5,707E-05
M AI N ENG  CHARG E AI R FI LTER 1
Air filter clogged
MAIN ENG AIR 
FILTER1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AI N ENG  SUPERCHARG ER 1
Supercharger
failure
MAIN ENG 
SUPERCHARG
ER1
MTTF=26280
Q=0,001823
M AI N ENG  START  BATTERI ES 1
Battery voltage
low
MAIN ENG 
START 
BATTERIES1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AI N ENG  START M O TO R 1
Start Motor
failure
MAIN ENG 
START 
MOTOR 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AI N ENG  START SWI TCH 1
Start Switch
failure
MAIN ENG 
START 
SWITCH 1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AI N ENG  START SYS WI RI NG  1
Start System
Wiring failure
MAIN ENG 
START SYS 
WIRING 1
MTTF=26280
Q=7,61E-06
16 
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Fault Tree Diagrams 
 
M AIN ENGINE NO:2
2
Main Engine
No:2 Failure
M AI N ENG I NE FUEL SYSTEM 2
Page 22
Fuel Supply
Failure
M AI N ENG I NE LUB O I L SYSTEM2
Page 23
Lubrication Oil
Pressure Low
M AI N ENG I NE CO O LI NG  WATER SYSTEM2
Page 24
Cooling Water
Temperature
High
M AI N ENG  LUB O I L TEM P 2
Page 25
Lubrication Oil
Temperature
High
M AI N ENG  CHARG E AI R SYS 2
Charge Air
Supply Failure
M AI N ENG  START SYS 2
Start System
Failure
M AI N ENG  ALARM  SYS 2
Alarm System
Failure
MAIN ENG 
ALARM SYS2
MTTF=10512
Q=6,468E-05
M AI N ENG  WATER M I XED I NTO  LUB OIL2
Water Mixed into
Lubrication Oil
MAIN ENG LUB 
OIL MIXED 
WATER 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AI N ENG  CHARG E AI R FI LTER 2
Air filter clogged
MAIN ENG AIR 
FILTER2
MTTF=26280
Q=3,805E-06
M AI N ENG  SUPERCHARG ER 2
Supercharger
failure
MAIN ENG 
SUPERCHARG
ER2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AI N ENG  START BATTERI ES 2
Battery voltage
low
MAIN ENG 
START 
BATTERIES2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AI N ENG  START M O TO R 2
Start Motor
failure
MAIN ENG 
START 
MOTOR 2
MTTF=26280
Q=0,0004564
M AI N ENG  START SWI TCH 2
Start Switch
failure
MAIN ENG 
START 
SWITCH 2
MTTF=26280
Q=5,708E-06
M AI N ENG  START SYS WI RING  2
Start System
Wiring failure
MAIN ENG 
START SYS 
WIRING 2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
17 
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M AIN ENGINE FUEL SYSTEM 1
16
Fuel Supply
Failure
DUBLEX FILTERS
Dublex Filters
Clogged
M AIN ENG FUEL  SRVC PUM P 1
Fuel Service
Pump Failure No
fuel at fuel filter
inlet
MAIN ENG 
FUEL SRVC 
PUMP1
MTTF=26280
Q=0,0002283
MAIN ENG FUEL PUMP 1
Bosch Type Fuel
Pump Failure
MAIN ENG 
FUEL PUMP1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG ıNJECTORS 1
Some Injectors
do not spray fuel
MAIN ENG 
INJECTORS1
MTTF=17520
Q=9,512E-05
M AIN ENG PIPING FUEL SYS 1
Fuel Leakage on
fuel piping
MAIN ENG 
PIPING FUEL 
SYS1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG DUBLEX FUEL FILT A1
Fuel Filter
Glogged
MAIN ENG 
DUBLEX 
FILTER A1
MTTF=26280
Q=5,708E-06
MAIN DUBLEX FUEL FILT B1
Fuel Filter
Clogged
MAIN ENG 
DUBLEX FUEL 
FILT B1
MTTF=26280
Q=5,708E-06
18 
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M AIN ENGINE LUB OIL SYSTEM1
16
Lubrication Oil
Pressure Low
M AIN ENG LUB OIL TEM P 1
Page 21
Lubrication Oil
Temperature
High
M AIN ENG SUM P OIL LEVEL 1
Oil level is low
MAIN ENG 
SUMP OIL 
LEVEL1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG FILTER OIL 1
Oil Filter clogged
MAIN ENG 
FILTER OIL1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG LUB OIL PUM P 1
Lub Oil Pump
Failure
MAIN ENG LUB 
OIL PUMP1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG M AIN BEARINGS 1
Main Bearings
worn
MAIN ENG 
MAIN 
BEARINGS1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG CON ROD BEARINGS 1
Connecting Rod
Bearings worn
MAIN ENG 
CON ROD 
BEARINGS1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG LUB OIL PIPING SYS 1
Leakage on lub
oil piping system
MAIN ENG 
PIPING OIL1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
19 
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M AI N ENG I NE CO O LI NG  WATER SYSTEM1
16
Cooling Water
Temperature
High
M AIN ENG SEA WATER SYS 1
21
Sea water supply
loss
MAIN ENG F/W HEX 1
Fresh water HEX
clogged
MAIN ENG F/W  
HEX1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG F/W LEVEL 1
Fresh Water
Level low
MAIN ENG F/W  
LEVEL1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG THERM OSTAT 1
Thermostat
failure
MAIN ENG  
THERMOSTAT
1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG F/W PUM P 1
Fresh Water
Pump failure
MAIN ENG F/W  
PUMP1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG S/W SUPPLY SYS
Sea water supply
loss
M AIN ENG S/W PIPING 1
Leakage on S/W
Piping
MAIN ENG S/W  
PIPING1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AI N ENG  S/ W SUCTI O N VALVE 1
Suction Valve
stucked closed
MAIN ENG S/W  
SUCTION 
VALVE1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG S/W PUM P 1
S/W Pump failure
MAIN ENG S/W  
PUMP1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AI N ENG  S/ W PUM P SUPPLY
Main Sea Water
System Failure
EM ERGENCY S/W SUPPLY
Emergency sea
water supply loss
MAIN ENG  
EMER S/W  
SUPPLY1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
20 
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Fault Tree Diagrams 
 
MAIN ENG LUB OIL TEMP 1
16,19
Lubrication Oil
Temperature
High
M AIN ENG SEA WATER SYS 1
20
Sea water supply
loss
MAIN ENG LUB OIL HEX 1
Lub Oil HEX
clogged
MAIN ENG LUB  
OIL HEX1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG SUM P OIL LEVEL 1
Oil level is low
MAIN ENG  
SUMP OIL 
LEVEL1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG S/W SUPPLY SYS
Sea water supply
loss
MAIN ENG S/W PIPING 1
Leakage on S/W
Piping
MAIN ENG S/W  
PIPING1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG S/W SUCTION VALVE 1
Suction Valve
stucked closed
MAIN ENG S/W  
SUCTION 
VALVE1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG S/W PUMP 1
S/W Pump failure
MAIN ENG S/W  
PUMP1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG S/W PUM P SUPPLY
Main Sea Water
System Failure
EMERGENCY S/W SUPPLY
Emergency sea
water supply loss
MAIN ENG  
EMER S/W  
SUPPLY1
MTTF=52560
Q=0
21 
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M AIN ENGINE FUEL SYSTEM 2
17
Fuel Supply
Failure
DUBLEX FILTERS1
Dublex Filters
Clogged
M AIN ENG FUEL  SRVC PUM P 2
Fuel Service
Pump Failure No
fuel at fuel filter
inlet
MAIN ENG 
FUELSRVC 
PUMP2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG FUEL PUMP 2
Bosch Type Fuel
Pump Failure
MAIN ENG 
FUEL PUMP2
MTTF=26280
Q=0,0009124
MAIN ENG ıNJECTORS 2
Some Injectors
do not spray fuel
MAIN ENG 
INJECTORS2
MTTF=26280
Q=3,805E-05
M AIN ENG PIPING FUEL SYS 2
Fuel Leakage on
fuel piping
MAIN ENG 
PIPING FUEL 
SYS2
MTTF=26280
Q=1,522E-05
M AIN ENG DUBLEX FUEL FILT A2
Fuel Filter
Glogged
MAIN ENG 
DUBLEX FUEL 
FILT A2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN DUBLEX FUEL FILT B2
Fuel Filter
Clogged
MAIN ENG 
DUBLEX FUEL 
FILT B2
MTTF=26280
Q=5,708E-06
22 
  
SHIP RELIABILITY 
127 
  
Fault Tree Diagrams 
 
M AIN ENGINE LUB OIL SYSTEM2
17
Lubrication Oil
Pressure Low
M AIN ENG LUB OIL TEM P 2
Page 25
Lubrication Oil
Temperature
High
M AIN ENG SUM P OIL LEVEL 2
Oil level is low
MAIN ENG 
SUMP OIL 
LEVEL2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
MAIN ENG FILTER OIL 2
Oil Filter clogged
MAIN ENG 
FILTER OIL2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG LUB OIL PUM P 2
Lub Oil Pump
Failure
MAIN ENG LUB 
OIL PUMP2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG M AIN BEARINGS 2
Main Bearings
worn
MAIN ENG 
MAIN 
BEARINGS2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG CON ROD BEARINGS 2
Connecting Rod
Bearings worn
MAIN ENG 
CON ROD 
BEARINGS2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG LUB OIL PIPING SYS 2
Leakage on lub
oil piping system
MAIN ENG 
PIPING OIL2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
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M AI N ENG I NE CO O LI NG  WATER SYSTEM2
17
Cooling Water
Temperature
High
M AIN ENG SEA WATER SYS 2
25
Sea water supply
loss
MAIN ENG F/W HEX 2
Fresh water HEX
clogged
MAIN ENG F/W  
HEX2
MTTF=26280
Q=5,707E-05
M AIN ENG F/W LEVEL 2
Fresh Water
Level low
MAIN ENG F/W  
LEVEL2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG THERM OSTAT 2
Thermostat
failure
MAIN ENG  
THERMOSTAT
2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG F/W PUM P 2
Fresh Water
Pump failure
MAIN ENG F/W  
PUMP2
MTTF=26280
Q=0,0001522
M AIN ENG S/W SUPPLY SYS1
Sea water supply
loss
M AIN ENG S/W PIPING 2
Leakage on S/W
Piping
MAIN ENG S/W  
PIPING2
MTTF=17520
Q=1,522E-05
M AI N ENG  S/ W SUCTI O N VALVE 2
Suction Valve
stucked closed
MAIN ENG S/W  
SUCTION 
VALVE2
MTTF=26280
Q=1,522E-05
M AIN ENG S/W PUM P 2
S/W Pump failure
MAIN ENG S/W  
PUMP2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AI N ENG  S/ W PUM P SUPPLY1
Main Sea Water
System Failure
EM ERGENCY S/W SUPPLY1
Emergency sea
water supply loss
MAIN ENG  
EMER S/W  
SUPPLY2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
24 
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MAIN ENG LUB OIL TEMP 2
17,23
Lubrication Oil
Temperature
High
M AIN ENG SEA WATER SYS 2
24
Sea water supply
loss
MAIN ENG LUB OIL HEX 2
Lub Oil HEX
clogged
MAIN ENG LUB  
OIL HEX2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG SUM P OIL LEVEL 2
Oil level is low
MAIN ENG  
SUMP OIL 
LEVEL2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG S/W SUPPLY SYS1
Sea water supply
loss
MAIN ENG S/W PIPING 2
Leakage on S/W
Piping
MAIN ENG S/W  
PIPING2
MTTF=17520
Q=1,522E-05
M AIN ENG S/W SUCTION VALVE 2
Suction Valve
stucked closed
MAIN ENG S/W  
SUCTION 
VALVE2
MTTF=26280
Q=1,522E-05
MAIN ENG S/W PUMP 2
S/W Pump failure
MAIN ENG S/W  
PUMP2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
M AIN ENG S/W PUM P SUPPLY1
Main Sea Water
System Failure
EM ERGENCY S/W SUPPLY1
Emergency sea
water supply loss
MAIN ENG  
EMER S/W  
SUPPLY2
MTTF=52560
Q=0
25 
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